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Abstract 
Authenticated Encryption (AE) is a symmetric-key scheme providing both 
confidentiality and integrity assurance to sensitive information transmitted through 
a network between two parties. This assures the protected message cannot be read 
or changed without detection by unauthorized parties. The most common way to 
achieve AE is using block cipher modes to provide confidentiality and a Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) or an Integrity Check Vector (ICV) to provide integrity 
assurance. There are two common approaches to provide AE: processing the data 
once with one algorithm that provides both confidentiality and integrity or 
processing the data twice with two algorithms, one for confidentiality and another 
for integrity. We focus on the former approach in this research. 
In this research project we first analyse and evaluate the integrity assurance of three 
AE schemes based on block ciphers. These schemes are Efficient Error-Propagating 
Block Chaining (EPBC), Input and Output Block Chaining (IOBC) and New Memory-
Plaintext Ciphertext Block Chaining (M-PCBC). These schemes are all cross chaining 
block cipher modes that use an ICV appended to the message to provide integrity 
assurance. Secondly, we briefly look at one of the submissions to the recent Security, 
Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) competition, namely AES-JAMBU. This cipher 
also uses block chaining but uses a MAC rather than an ICV approach to provide 
integrity assurance. Our investigations include verifying the validity of existing and 
new attacks, and implementing attacks to verify claimed probabilities of successful 
forgeries.  
We have extended a chosen plaintext forgery attack on IOBC that was proposed by 
Mitchell by applying it also to EPBC and M-PCBC. We determined the complexity and 
success probability for this attack in each of the three cases. In addition, we propose 
an alternative approach to run this generic attack. This approach has similar 
complexities and success probability on EPBC and IOBC, and relatively lower success 
probability on M-PCBC. Previous analysis of EPBC claimed that a weakness of this 
algorithm allows its integrity to be breached by known-plaintext attack; however, we 
show that this attack on EPBC is no more effective than a brute force attack on the 
ICV. The alternative attacks we proposed on IOBC and M-PCBC can break their 
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integrity protection with similar success probabilities as claimed in their 
corresponding previous analysis. Therefore, these two schemes fail to guarantee the 
assurance of integrity services to messages. 
The block chaining feature of AES-JAMBU is similar to EPBC, IOBC and M-PCBC. 
Because of this, we apply similar attacks performed on the other three schemes to 
AES-JAMBU to examine its integrity assurance. The generic attack discussed above 
can also work on AES-JAMBU, but the calculation complexity is prohibitive. None of 
the other attacks can be better than guessing the tag. Therefore, from our 
observation, AES-JAMBU is secure in practice. However, more security analysis of AE 
proposals needs to be conducted prior to their adoption in a cryptographic standard. 
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Notation overview 
The following notation will be used consistently throughout this thesis: 
Variables 
iP   The i -th block of plaintext message. 
P  The bit length of the plaintext message. 
u   The number of blocks in the plaintext message. 
iC   The i -th block of ciphertext message. 
C   The bit length of the ciphertext. 
K   The secret key. 
'K  The second secret key. 
n   The block length of underlying block cipher. 
IV Initialization vector. 
T   The output value of Message Authentication Code. 
iF , iG   The i -th block of inner vector. 
iM   The i -th block of memory content.  
A    Associated data. 
N    Nonce. 
0i     String  consisting of i  ‘0’s. 
10i   Binary string consisting of a 1 followed by i  ‘0’s. 
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Operations and functions 
x        The least integer that is not less than the real number x . 
len       The truncation function. 
ntz( )i    The largest integer z such that 2z divides i . 
a x       If 1 2 0 {0,1}
n
n na a a a    , 
1 2
1 2 1 0
n n
n na x a x a x a x a
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      . 
X Y   Concatenation of two bit strings X andY .  
X Y   Bitwise exclusive-OR of two bit strings X andY . 
i          Right rotation by i bit positions. 
( )Ke X    Block cipher encryption of X under the keyK . 
( )Kd X   Block cipher decryption of X  under the keyK . 
( )Pr E     The probability of event E . 
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1. Introduction 
When two parties communicate through a network they may need confidentiality 
and integrity for their sensitive information. Confidentiality assures the protected 
message can only be read by the intended receiver and that unauthorized parties 
cannot understand it [1]. Integrity means an unauthorized party cannot accidentally 
or intentionally change information during transmission without detection [1]. If the 
unauthorized party can change the original message without being detected by the 
receiver, then they can perform a successful forgery attack, breaching the integrity 
of the message. 
Solely providing confidentiality to information is insecure; an attacker may tamper 
with information in transit without being detected. For example, an attacker can 
intercept an encrypted message, and then cut and paste packets together to forge a 
different encrypted message [2]. Similarly, applying an integrity assurance 
mechanism alone results in messages being exposed to an adversary who is 
monitoring communications between two parties. For example, an attacker might 
gain an advantage from knowledge of certain information even with no ability to 
modify it [3]. Recently cryptographic designers have proposed providing both 
confidentiality and integrity in one cipher. Simultaneous provision of both 
confidentiality and integrity assurance is known as Authenticated Encryption (AE) [3]. 
Confidentiality is achieved by using an encryption algorithm to encrypt messages. 
The encrypted message is referred to as the ciphertext. The original message is 
known as the plaintext. The most common type of encryption algorithm is symmetric 
encryption where the sender and receiver share the same secret key. With 
symmetric encryption, there are two main approaches: block ciphers and stream 
ciphers. For block ciphers, the message is divided into blocks of length defined by the 
underlying block ciphers, and encrypted by an encryption algorithm using a secret 
key. For stream ciphers, the bits of a message are encrypted one bit at a time using 
the corresponding keystream. The keystream is typically generated by digital shift 
registers using a random seed value as input. We focus on block ciphers in this thesis.  
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There are several different modes of operation for block ciphers. These were 
originally developed as variant ways of encrypting messages, but were later 
extended to provide separate integrity assurance and, more recently, to provide 
authenticated encryption in a single operation. 
The traditional approach for providing integrity assurance is to generate a Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) for a message. The message could be either plaintext or 
ciphertext. The output of the MAC function is known as the tag. This is a short string, 
which should depend on both the full content of the message and the secret key. 
The dependence on the message should be such that changes in the message cause 
changes in the MAC tag value [4]. 
An alternative approach is to incorporate a pre-agreed Integrity Check Vector (ICV) 
at the end of the plaintext message before encryption to provide integrity assurance 
[5]. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext and checks the correctness of ICV. 
Messages with an incorrect ICV are rejected by the receiver [5]. The success of this 
approach relies on the ability of the block cipher to propagate any modifications in 
the ciphertext to the subsequent blocks, resulting in the decryption of the ICV being 
affected.  Some block cipher modes such as Electronic Codebook (ECB) and Counter 
(CTR) [6] cannot provide error propagation to following blocks. In this thesis we 
focus mainly on AE algorithms which use the ICV approach and block chaining mode 
of operation.  
There are a large number of different AE proposals based on block ciphers. In order 
to limit the scope of the research, we decide to examine a documented flaw that 
leads to a forgery attack and see whether it could be applied to other similar 
proposals. 
The most common attack on integrity assurance mechanisms is a forgery attack. In a 
forgery attack, the attacker constructs a message and provides the appropriate value 
(MAC or ICV) so that the forged message will be accepted as legitimate by the 
receiver [4]. 
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In this thesis we first concentrate on forgery attacks on particular block cipher 
modes of operation that provide AE. We examine in detail three schemes: Efficient 
error-propagating block chaining (EPBC) [7], Input and output block chaining (IOBC) 
[5] and New Memory-Plaintext ciphertext block chaining (M-PCBC) [8]. These 
schemes are cross chaining block ciphers using ICVs to provide integrity assurance. 
We also look briefly at one of the submissions to the recent Competition for 
Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR), namely 
AES-JAMBU [9]. This cipher also uses block chaining but uses the MAC approach 
rather than the ICV approach to provide integrity assurance.  
1.1 Aims and objectives 
The aims of this thesis are as follows: 
1. Examine three AE schemes (EPBC, IOBC and M-PCBC) based on block ciphers 
which use an ICV to provide data integrity, including: 
a) Review existing analyses. 
b) Develop theoretical foundation for existing attacks.  
c) Verify the validity of both existing and new forgery attacks 
experimentally, through simulations – coding them in C programming 
language. 
d) Implement attacks to verify claimed probabilities of successful 
forgeries. 
2. Examine an AE scheme (AES-JAMBU) based on block ciphers that uses 
chaining but generates a MAC rather than using an ICV, and determine the 
applicability of the attacks considered in Aim 1 to this scheme. 
1.2 Contributions and achievements 
The major achievements in this thesis are: 
1. Correcting a flaw in existing analysis.  We conducted theoretical analysis of 
the three target schemes, examining potential forgery attacks. A flaw was 
found in previous analysis for EPBC; we show that the integrity protection 
provided by EPBC is actually better than previous analysis suggested.  
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This work is presented in Sect. 3.2 and has been published as Binbin Di, 
Leonie Simpson, Harry Bartlett, Ed Dawson and Kenneth Wong. Correcting 
flaws in Mitchell’s analysis of EPBC, in Australasian Information Security 
Conferences, 2015, CRPIT Sydney, Vol. 161, pp. 57-60.  
2. Extending types of forgeries that can be performed. We develop theoretical 
foundation for existing and new attacks. Furthermore, we proposed 
alternative forgery attacks on each target scheme. Those forgeries were 
derived from the existing attacks. We also verified the validity of both 
existing and new forgery attacks by coding them in C programming language.  
1.3 Outline of thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 Authenticated encryption: First, we explain how block ciphers provide 
confidentiality protection for a message, and describe modes of operation of block 
ciphers. Second, we explain how a MAC and an ICV provide integrity protection for 
messages and review the security of integrity assurance mechanisms. Third, we 
describe three proposed modes of operation (EPBC, IOBC and M-PCBC) which are 
intended to provide AE and are based on block ciphers using ICVs.  
Chapter 3 Forgery attacks on block ciphers using ICVs: First, we explain the generic 
weakness of the three schemes which use ICVs and go on to determine the 
complexity and success probability of this attack. Second, we theoretically analyse 
each scheme and review existing cryptanalysis for these schemes. Third, we verify 
the validity of existing forgeries by coding them in C programming language. Fourth, 
we propose alternative attacks, and compare the efficiency of all attacks for each 
scheme. Finally, we draw conclusions for each scheme. 
Chapter 4 Recent one-pass proposals: We briefly discuss a recently proposed one-
pass scheme: AES-JAMBU. This is a submission to the CAESAR competition. We apply 
the approaches discussed in Chapter 3 to this scheme.  
Chapter 5 Conclusion: We summarise the results of analysis for each scheme and 
present future work.  
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2. Authenticated encryption  
Symmetric-key encryption, also known as shared key encryption, uses the same key 
for both encryption and decryption. Public key encryption, on the other hand, 
involves using two different keys, a public key to encrypt data and a private key to 
decrypt data [4; Chapter 7]. The research in this thesis relates to symmetric-key 
block ciphers. There are two well-known types of block ciphers: Feistel ciphers and 
substitution-permutation network (SPN) ciphers [10].  
AE schemes provide both confidentiality and integrity protection to messages 
transmitted over a network. The confidentiality is provided by the underlying block 
cipher algorithm. MAC or ICV mechanisms are used to ensure message integrity. In 
this chapter, firstly, we explain block ciphers and three block cipher modes of 
operation. Secondly, we explain MACs, ICVs and the approaches to analyse integrity 
assurance mechanisms. Thirdly, we explain three approaches to provide AE and 
briefly review existing analysis of some commonly used AE modes. Finally, we 
describe the three target AE schemes we investigate in this thesis.  
2.1 Block ciphers 
A block cipher is a type of encryption function which breaks a plaintext message into 
fixed-length blocks and then encrypts each block in sequence [4; Chapter 7], as 
shown in Fig. 2.1, where iP   denotes the i -th block of plaintext message; iC   
denotes the i -th block of ciphertext message. Block ciphers can be used to provide 
confidentiality and in some modes can be used to form MAC algorithms. The 
encryption and decryption processes take place under the action of a secret key, 
which can be either a symmetric-key or public key.  
 
Figure 2.1 Block cipher 
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2.1.1 Feistel ciphers 
A Feistel cipher [10] is an iterated cipher which divides each plaintext message block 
into two half blocks with equal length, say 
1iL   (as “left”) and 1iR   (as “right”), where 
i represents the iteration. Then the function f  is applied to the right 1iR  and the 
secret key 
iK  together to produce an output; the output of f is XORed with the left
1iL  ; the two half blocks then swap to produce new left iL and right iR , as shown in 
Fig. 2.2. The encryption applies several rounds for each block. The decryption is 
simply reversing the process of encryption. Data Encryption Standard (DES) is an 
example of a Feistel cipher, which has a block length of 64 bits and uses a secret key 
length of 56 bits with 16 rounds [10]. 
 
Figure 2.2 Feistel ladder diagram [10] 
2.1.2  Substitution-permutation network (SPN) ciphers 
A Substitution-permutation network (SPN) block cipher is an iterated cipher. In each 
round, the plaintext is first XORed with the round secret key and the result is then 
fed into the substitution function and then the permutation function in several 
rounds to yield the ciphertext block [10], as shown in Fig. 2.3.  The decryption is 
simply a reverse process of the encryption. An example of an SPN block cipher is 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [10]. AES has block length of 128 bits and 
allows three key lengths, namely 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits. In this research we 
mainly use AES as the block cipher, but we also use DES for a special case.  
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Figure 2.3 SPN network [10] 
2.1.3 Modes of operation 
Here we will briefly describe three common block cipher modes which provide 
confidentiality or integrity for messages. We include descriptions of the three most 
well-known modes of operation for block ciphers, but note that there are many 
more. 
2.1.3.1 Electronic Codebook (ECB)  
Electronic codebook (ECB) mode is a mode which can be used to provide 
confidentiality. The message is divided into blocks, padding the last block to the 
cipher’s block size if necessary, and each block is encrypted separately with the same 
key to generate the corresponding ciphertext block [6]. Fig. 2.4 below shows the ECB 
mode. 
 
Figure 2.4 ECB mode[6] 
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Encryption: 
( )i K iC e P  for 1 i u  .   
In ECB decryption, each ciphertext block is decrypted separately with the same key 
to gain the corresponding plaintext block [6]. 
Decryption: 
( )i K iP d C  for 1 i u  . 
2.1.3.2 Cipher-block Chaining (CBC) 
The cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode is a mode which can be used to provide 
confidentiality. In CBC encryption, the message is divided into blocks, padding the 
last block to the cipher’s block size if necessary, and each plaintext block is XORed 
with previous ciphertext block and encrypted separately with the same key [6]. An 
initialization vector (IV) is introduced to combine with the first plaintext block. The IV 
does not need to be confidential, but it must be random or psuedorandom. Fig. 2.5 
below shows the CBC mode.  
 
Figure 2.5 CBC mode [6] 
Encryption: 
1( )i K i iC e P C    for 1 i u  , where 0C IV . 
In CBC decryption, each ciphertext block is decrypted with the key, and the output is 
XORed with previous ciphertext block to yield corresponding plaintext block [6].  
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Decryption: 
1( )i K i iP d C C    for 1 i u  , where 0C IV .  
This mode can be used for MAC generation, as discussed later. 
2.1.3.3 Counter (CTR) 
The counter (CTR) mode is a mode which can be used to provide confidentiality. A 
counter with the same block size as the plaintext is used. The counter is started at 
some value, such as zero, and then incremented by one for every subsequent block, 
which guarantees the uniqueness of counter values. The message is divided into 
blocks, padding the last block to the cipher’s block size if necessary. Each counter is 
encrypted with the same key, and the output is XORed with each plaintext block to 
create corresponding ciphertext block [6]. Fig. 2.6 below shows the CTR mode. 
 
Figure 2.6 CTR mode [6] 
Encryption: 
( )i K i iC e ctr P   for 1 i u  . 
In CTR decryption, each counter is again encrypted with the same key, and the 
output is XORed with each ciphertext block to yield corresponding plaintext block [6]. 
Decryption: 
( )i K i iP e ctr C   for 1 i u  . 
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2.2 Integrity assurance 
There are a couple of different mechanisms which can be used to check if data 
integrity has been breached, such as MACs and ICVs. The details of these approaches 
are discussed below, followed by a discussion on cryptanalysis of these mechanisms.  
2.2.1 Integrity assurance mechanisms 
Message authentication codes (MACs) 
MAC algorithms use symmetric techniques to provide data integrity assurance. There 
are two input parameters for a MAC algorithm, a message and a secret key, and a 
fixed size output. The use of a secret key should guarantee that it is infeasible for an 
attacker to generate the same output as the key holders. Typical key sizes are 56, 64 
or 128 bits [4; Chapter 7].  
In order to provide integrity protection to messages, the sender uses a shared secret 
key to produce a MAC tag corresponding to the message, appends the MAC tag to 
the message and sends it to the receiver. Typically the tag length is somewhere 
between 32 and 128 bits. On the receiving side, the receiver calculates the MAC tag 
for the received message using the same MAC function and secret key, and then 
compares it with the transmitted MAC value [4, 11] , as shown in Fig. 2.7. If they are 
same, the receiver considers the received message is genuine and accepts it. 
Otherwise, the receiver assumes the message has been tampered with during 
transmission, and it should be rejected.  
 
Figure 2.7 Message authentication codes 
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A secure MAC function should be collision resistant [4; Chapter 9]. In such a case, an 
attacker cannot find a collision (two different messages have the same MAC tag) or 
produce a valid MAC tag for a new message without knowing the secret key. 
However, MACs do not provide non-repudiation protection. Specifically, they do not 
prevent a party from subsequently claiming the transaction was invalid. Digital 
signatures can also provide non-repudiation protection, which will not be discussed 
in this thesis.   
As mentioned in Sect. 2.1.3.2, CBC mode can be used to construct a MAC providing 
integrity to messages. CBC-MAC is a well-known MAC, which is unforgeable if the 
length of message is fixed [4; Chapter 9]. CBC-MAC is computed as follows: 
1 1( )KC e P IV  ; 1( )i K i iC e P C    for 2 i u  ; uT C .  
In other words, the last block of ciphertext is used as the MAC, denoted T .  Note 
that, if CBC mode is used for both encryption and the MAC, then CBC-MAC should 
use a different key from the one need to provide confidentiality. Otherwise, an 
attacker can cut off at least the last two ciphertext blocks without affecting the 
integrity mechanism [12].  
For the verification, the receiver re-computes the MAC tag 'T  by applying the CBC-
MAC generation process to the recovered message. The receiver accepts the 
message as genuine if the tag 'T  matches to the tag T in the last block of ciphertext; 
else rejects the messages as invalid.  
Integrity Check Vector (ICV) 
An alternative approach for providing integrity assurance is to incorporate a pre-
agreed Integrity Check Vector (ICV) at the end of the plaintext message before 
encryption [5]. The success of this approach relies on the ability of the block cipher 
to propagate any modifications in the ciphertext to the subsequent blocks, resulting 
in the decryption of the ICV being affected.  When the ciphertext is decrypted, the 
receiver checks the correctness of ICV. Any change to the ciphertext should 
propagate erroneous decryptions to all subsequent ciphertext blocks, resulting in the 
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decryption to an incorrect ICV, as shown in Fig. 2.8. Messages with an incorrect ICV 
are rejected by the receiver. 
 
Figure 2.8 Integrity check vector [5] 
2.2.2 Cryptanalysis of integrity assurance mechanisms 
We first consider cryptanalysis for MACs, since this is the more commonly used 
approach for integrity assurance. Comments relating to ICVs will be found at the end 
of this section. 
To cryptanalyse MAC algorithms [4, 11], the attacker is assumed to know the format 
of messages and the MAC algorithms but the secret key is assumed to be unknown. 
The attacker intercepts a ciphertext, modifies the ciphertext and the corresponding 
MAC, and tries to deceive the receiver to accept the modified message as authentic. 
There are three attack scenarios for MACs [4; Chapter 9]: 
 Known-message attack: a sequence of messages and the corresponding 
MACs are available to the adversary.  
 Chosen-message attack: the adversary is able to choose a sequence of 
messages and obtain the corresponding MACs from the encrypting party. 
 Adaptive-chosen message attack: this is a special case of chosen-message 
attack in which the adversary is able to successively choose messages to 
request MAC on the basis of previous queries. 
Security of MAC algorithms 
Assume that the attacker knows the structure of the messages and the MAC 
algorithms and a small number of message-MAC pairs. In order to deceive the 
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receiver to accept a forged ciphertext, there are two options: forgery attack and key 
recovery attack [4, 11].  
 In a forgery attack, an attacker does not know the secret key. There are two 
scenarios for forgery attacks: existential forgery and selective forgery. For the 
existential forgery, an attacker is able to construct a new message-MAC pair 
but does not have full control of the message’s content. For the selective 
forgery, an attacker is able to generate a new message of his own choice and 
determines the corresponding MAC. 
 A key recovery attack involves obtaining the secret key from encrypted 
messages. This enables the adversary to produce MACs for arbitrary forgeries.  
In addition, there are three basic attacks on MACs [4, 11] that are used to compare 
the effectiveness of the attacks above. These are: 
 Brute force key search:  The attacker tries all possible keys to find a correct 
key used to construct the known message- MAC pairs. Then the attacker can 
use that key to generate a tag for a modified message. The probability that 
the attacker determines the correct key is 2 k , where k is the length of the 
secret key. 
 Brute force of MAC:  The attacker simply chooses a random message and 
guesses a MAC value to append for any given message. This approach 
requires at most 2l  trials to find a correct MAC, where the length of the MAC 
is l  bits. 
  Collision attack: There are two different messages, P and 'P . A collision 
happens if '( ) ( )K KMAC P MAC P . This collision guarantees the attacker to 
produce a verifiable MAC forgery.  By the birthday paradox [13], this 
approach requires roughly /22l trials to find at least one collision, where l is 
the length of the MAC.  
Note that similar scenarios can be applied for ICV’s by replacing information about 
the MAC by information about the ciphertext blocks which encrypt the ICV, except 
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the collision attack. For ICV case, a collision happens if two distinct ciphertexts both 
decrypt to give the same ICV. 
2.3 Authenticated encryption using block ciphers 
An authenticated encryption scheme is a symmetric-key scheme providing both 
confidentiality and integrity for messages in storage or transmission. There are three 
solutions to provide AE:  generic-composition mechanisms, one-pass schemes and 
two-pass schemes, which are described below. The differences between these three 
solutions are: the generic-composition AE schemes require two different modes with 
two different keys processing the message twice; whereas the other schemes each 
use a single key- the one-pass AE schemes achieve AE using a single pass through the 
data, processing the message once to yield the ciphertext and the tag, while the two-
pass schemes process the data twice (one pass provides confidentiality and another 
pass provides integrity). 
As discussed in Sect. 2.1, the most common way to achieve AE is using block cipher 
modes. Block cipher ECB and CBC mode can be used to provide confidentiality to 
generic-composition mechanisms and two-pass schemes. MACs can be added to 
those schemes to provide integrity protection, so that an attacker cannot reorder 
the ciphertext or delete ciphertext blocks. The pre-computed keystream allows CTR 
to preprocess a message header which can relatively lower computation time. These 
characteristics mean that CTR is a common choice for constructing two-pass AE 
schemes. We mainly investigate one-pass schemes which use ICV approach and 
block chaining mode of operation in this thesis. This section has been included for 
completeness; all of the schemes we examine in this thesis are one pass schemes. 
2.3.1 Generic-composition 
Providing both confidentiality and authenticity for messages has been desired for 
decades, prior to the emergence of the formal definition of AE. Traditionally, two 
algorithms are used: one for confidentiality and the other providing integrity 
respectively, and these are both used on the message in a straightforward fashion.  
The generic-composition mechanism applies two independent secret keys, K  for 
the block cipher scheme and 'K  for the MAC scheme, respectively. Providing both 
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confidentiality and integrity to a message in this fashion can be approached in three 
different ways [14]. 
1. MAC-then-Encrypt. Form a MAC for the message P  using the key K  to 
produce the tag T  ( MAC ( )KT P ’ ), and concatenate the message P  and 
the tag T . Then encrypt the message P and tag T with the key K , and send 
the result, ( )Ke P T , to the receiver. 
2. Encrypt-then-MAC. Encrypt the message P with the key K  to produce 
ciphertext C ( ( )KC e P ), then MAC the ciphertext C with key 'K  to 
generate a pair ( )C T  where 'MAC ( )KT C , and send the result, ( )C T , 
to the receiver. 
3. Encrypt-and-MAC. Encrypt the message P with the key K  to produce 
ciphertextC ( ( )KC e P ), then MAC message P with the key 'K  to generate 
a pair ( )C T  where 'MAC ( )KT P , and send the result, ( )C T , to the 
receiver. 
In order to verify the integrity of the message, the receiver calculates the MAC tag 
'T  for the received message using corresponding MAC function and then compares 
it with the transmitted MAC tag T .  Note that for MAC-then-Encrypt and Encrypt-
and-MAC, the received message has to be decrypted first, and then the comparison 
can be implemented. To achieve fast verification, the receiver should first verify the 
tag and then decrypt the message. In that case, the receiver can promptly discover if 
there has been malicious interception, thus saving unnecessary cost for decryption. 
Hence Encrypt-then-MAC seems more efficient than the other two compositions. 
In 2000, Bellare and Namprempre analysed the security of the approaches discussed 
above for building a generic-composition AE mechanism. These authors defined the 
following notions of security for AE [3]: 
1. Indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). No adversary 
can distinguish two previously known messages that have been encrypted 
under the secret key. 
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2. Indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). No adversary 
can choose arbitrary ciphertext and decrypt them to plaintext. 
3. Integrity of plaintext (INT-PTXT). It must be infeasible for an adversary to 
generate a ciphertext for a plaintext that is not encrypted by the sender. 
4. Integrity of ciphertext (INT-CTXT). It must be infeasible for an adversary to 
generate a ciphertext which is not generated by the sender previously, 
regardless this ciphertext is related to a plaintext or not. 
The results in Table 2.1 show that if the MAC is highly unforgeable and the 
underlying cipher is secure from attack, only the Encrypt-then-MAC approach can 
satisfy all of the security requirements discussed above [3].  
As noted above, the generic-composition AE schemes require two different modes 
with two different keys processing the message twice. Researchers desire alternative 
schemes to provide better efficiency and security [15]. Two alternative schemes will 
be discussed in Sect. 2.3.2 and Sect. 2.3.3.  
Method Confidentiality Integrity 
IND-CPA IND-CCA INT-PTXT INT-CTXT 
MAC-then-Encrypt Secure Insecure Secure Insecure 
Encrypt-then-MAC Secure Secure Secure Secure 
Encrypt-and-MAC Insecure Insecure Secure Insecure 
Table 2.1 The security performance of three generic-composition methods [3] 
2.3.2 Two-pass combined schemes 
The two-pass scheme processes the data twice: one pass addresses confidentiality 
and another pass addresses integrity. A simple model of two-pass schemes is shown 
in Fig. 2.9. The main difference between a generic-composition mode and a two-pass 
scheme is that the latter one only uses one secret key to achieve AE rather than two. 
Therefore, two-pass schemes demand less memory storage space and less key 
management. Well known two-pass schemes are CCM [16], EAX [17] and CWC [18]. 
The investigation of two-pass schemes is not the aim of this thesis.  
17 
 
 
Figure 2.9 The model of two-pass schemes 
2.3.3 One-pass combined schemes 
One-pass AE schemes achieve AE using a single pass through the data, processing the 
message once to yield the ciphertext and the tag. A simple model of one-pass 
schemes is shown in Fig. 2.10. In many schemes, the last ciphertext block is the tag 
of message. In others, a separate tag is generated from the ciphertext. Three one-
pass AE schemes, Integrity aware parallelizable mode (IAPM) [19], Offset codebook 
mode (OCB) [20] and One-key CBC MAC (OMAC) [21] have been approved by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).  We discuss these schemes 
briefly below. 
 
Figure 2.10 The model of one-pass schemes 
2.3.3.1 Integrity aware parallelizable mode (IAPM) 
Integrity aware parallelizable mode (IAPM) [19] is highly parallelizable AE scheme, 
proposed by Jutla in 2001. IAPM is claimed to have a proof of security. The provable 
security is based on the assumption that the underlying block cipher is secure. A 
unique nonce N  is applied to produce sequential random inner vectors, which are 
XORed with the inputs. Fig. 2.11 below shows the IAPM scheme. 
 
Figure 2.11 IAPM encryption [19] 
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IAPM processes a message P using nonce N  and a pair of symmetric keys 'K and 
K . The pair of keys 'K andK  is distributed between the communicating parties in 
advance. There are two main steps to randomise the plaintext: inner vectors 
generation and encryption/tag-generation. 
The encryption and MAC generation process is as follows:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Step 1: Inner vector-generation 
a. Encrypt N with 'K to get a set of values '( 1)i KV e N i    for 0 1i u   .  
b. Use sequential values iV to generate new pair-wise independent random 
inner vectors 1i i iS S V   for 0 1i u   where 1 0S  .  
Step 2: Encryption/tag-generation 
a. Encrypt each block of message by computing ( )i K i i iC e P S S    for
0 i u  . The inner vector iS  is XORed before and after the block cipher 
invocation, which assures message confidentiality. 
b. Compute the tag 1 1 0( ( ))K u uT e S P P S    . Note that two different 
inner vectors 0S and 1uS   are XORed with the sum of the plaintext blocks to 
assure message integrity.  
c. Output the authenticated ciphertext 1,..., uC C T .  
The decryption and MAC verification process is as follows: 
a. The receiver generates the inner vectors iS using the same process used by 
the sender. 
b. The block message 1 2, ,..., uP P P can be recovered from the ciphertext by the 
decryption operation ( )i K i i iP d C S S   for 0 i u  .  
c. The receiver re-computes the tag 1 1 0' ( ( ))K u uT e S P P S    and 
compares it with the tag T . If 'T T , the receiver accepts the message. If 
not, the receiver rejects the message. 
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2.3.3.2 Offset codebook mode (OCB) 
Offset codebook mode (OCB) [20], a successor of IAPM mode, was proposed by 
Rogaway, Bellare, Black and Krovetz in 2001. In this mode, a nonempty string P is 
encrypted by OCB, which invokes the block-cipher / 2P n    times.  
OCB has desirable performance attributes. The length of messages does not need to 
be a multiple of the block length n , namely, arbitrary-length messages are allowed. 
The nonce is required to be non-repeating, which has less opportunity to be misused 
and is more efficient than the IV.  A single block-cipher key is applied by OCB in all 
block-cipher encryptions and decryptions, which saves space and key-setup time. 
OCB adds minor overhead compared to conventional generic-composition modes. 
Fig. 2.12 below is indicative of OCB scheme. 
 
Figure 2.12 OCB encryption [20] 
Define (0 )nKL e , 1S L W  , 1 ( )i iS S L ntz i    for 2i  .  
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The decryption and MAC verification process is as follows: 
a. Partition C into 
1... uC C  and T . 
b. Compute the initial value ( )KW e N L   and 1,..., uS S . 
c. Decrypt blocks from 1 to 1u  . ( )i K i i iP d C S S   . 
d. Reveal the last block. 1( ( ) )u K u uZ e len C L x S
    ; uP  is the first uC  bits 
of 
uZ XORed with uC . 
e. Re-compute the tag. The output 'T  is the first  bits of
1 1( 0 ( ))K u u u ue P P C Z S

    . Return 1,..., uP P P if 'T T . Otherwise 
reject the message. 
2.3.3.3 One-key CBC MAC (OMAC) 
One-key CBC MAC (OMAC) [21], proposed by Iwata and Kurosawa in 2002, is a 
variant of the CBC MAC.  Where CBC-MAC is only secure for messages with fixed 
length, which must be a multiple of the block length, OMAC provides security for 
variable length messages. OMAC takes only one key compared to CBC MAC. Recall 
that CBC MAC is not secure for AE unless it uses two separate keys, one for 
confidentiality and the other for integrity. OMAC can be seen as an alternative 
variation proposal of CBC MAC with only one key. Fig. 2.13 below is the diagram of 
OMAC.   
 
Figure 2.13 OMAC encryption [21] 
The encryption and MAC generation process is as follows: 
a. Encrypt blocks from 1 to 1u  . 1( )i K i iC e P C   , where 0 0
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If  0,1
n
P , then OMAC computes exactly the same as the CBC-MAC, except 
for XORing L x before encrypting the last block, where (0 )nKL e  and x is 
some constant in (2 )nGF  . 1( )u K u uT C e P C L x     . 
If  0,1
n
P , then 10i  padding ( 1 modi n P n   ) is appended to P  and 
OMAC computes exactly the same as the CBC-MAC for the padded message, 
except for XORing 1L x  before encrypting the last block. 
1
1( 10 )
i
u K u uT C e P C L x

      
The decryption process and MAC verification process is as follows: 
a. Decrypt blocks from 1 to 1u  . 1( )i K i iP d C C   , where 0 0
nC  . 
b. Reveal the last block. 
If  0,1
n
P , 1(C )u K u uP d C L x    . 
If  0,1
n
P , 1110 (C )
i
u K u uP d C L x

     
c. Generate the tag. Use the above MAC generation to compute the tag 'T  for 
the message. If 'T T , then the message is valid. Otherwise, the message is 
rejected. 
2.3.3.4 Previous analysis of three one-pass schemes 
The integrity of OMAC and OCB has been previously investigated. We summarize 
those previous analyses in this section. 
Jia et al. [22] pointed out OMAC is vulnerable to a chosen-plaintext attack. Assume 
the attacker knows a large number of plaintext messages and their corresponding 
ciphertext messages. Assume also all these plaintext messages are encrypted using 
the same secret key. For a message 1 2 3, , ,..., uP P P P , if a collision such that 
' '
1 2 1 2( ) ( )K Ke P P e P P    can be found, the attacker can construct a message 
' '
1 2 3, , ,..., uP P P P  that is distinct from the given message but with the same tag T . By 
the birthday paradox, to find such a collision requires /22n chosen plaintexts. If the 
block length of the underlying cipher is 128 bits, then the complexity of finding such 
a collision is 642 .  
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Ferguson proved OCB mode is vulnerable to collision attacks in 2002 [23]. Assume 
the plaintext message 
1,..., uP P  is known to the attacker, and ciphertext 1,..., ,uC C T  is 
the corresponding encrypted version of the plaintext message. Assume also
4 5 6 7 0P P P P    . If a collision, i i j jP C P C   , occurs, the attacker can 
construct another set having ' ' ' '4 5 6 7 0P P P P    . Then the plaintext blocks 
4 5 6, ,P P P and 7P in the original message can be replaced by
' ' '
4 5 6, ,P P P and
'
7P while 
having the tag T unchanged. The probability of finding a collision is 2 1292u  . The 
forgery attack has a success probability of 0.5 when the above collision occurs. 
2.4 Description of AE schemes to be analysed 
The three one-pass schemes we will investigate in this thesis are Input and output 
block chaining (IOBC) [5], Efficient error-propagating block chaining (EPBC) [7], and 
Memory-plaintext cipher block chaining (M-PCBC) [8]. All of these use a predefined 
Integrity Check Vector (ICV) providing integrity protection to messages rather than a 
MAC algorithm such as IAPM, OCB and OMAC. Note that EPBC is designed as an 
improved mode of IOBC. They have similar encryption mechanisms, except the 
function g . We will introduce EPBC, IOBC and then M-PCBC in this section. We chose 
these ciphers to see if the existing analysis on IOBC could be applied to designs with 
similar structures. 
2.4.1 Input and output block chaining (IOBC)  
Input and output block chaining (IOBC) was proposed by Recacha in 1996 [5]. IOBC 
can be used with any block cipher. For integrity assurance, an ICV is appended to the 
plaintext message. The plaintext is divided into blocks with the block length as 
defined by the selected block cipher (padding if necessary to make the total length of 
messages be a multiple of the block size). When the ciphertext is decrypted, the 
receiver checks the correctness of ICV. Any change to the ciphertext should 
propagate erroneous decryptions to all subsequent ciphertext blocks, resulting in the 
decryption to an incorrect ICV [5], as shown in Fig. 2.14. Only messages with the 
expected ICV will be accepted by the receiver. 
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Figure 2.14 Integrity mechanism [5] 
 
Description 
IOBC is a mode of operation for an n  -bit block cipher, where n  is even, say 2n m . 
Two secret keys denoted K and 'K are used. One key,K , is used for encryption and 
decryption. The second secret key, 'K , and a sequence number S are used to 
generate a pair of secret n -bit initial vectors denoted by 
0F and 0G , where 
 '0 KF e S  and  '0 0KG e F . These initial vectors are required for encryption of the 
first plaintext block. 
The IOBC encryption operation is defined as follows:  
1i i iG P F  , 1 i u  , 
 i K iF e G ,1 i u  , 
 1i i iC F g G   , 2 i u  , 
where 
1 1 0C F G   . This process is shown in Fig. 2.15. 
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Figure 2.15 IOBC encryption 
The function g in IOBC is a 1-1 permutation function that maps an n -bit block to an 
n -bit block, which is defined as follows. Suppose X  is an n -bit block, where 
X L R and L and R are 1m  and 1m bits of X respectively. Then  
       1 1g X L R   , 
where > i signifies a sub-rotation of i -bit positions as illustrated in Fig. 2.16. 
 
Figure 2.16 The function g of IOBC 
The decryption operation of IOBC is simply a reverse process of the encryption as 
follows: 
 1i i iF C g G   , 2 i u  , 
 i K iG d F ,1 i u  , 
1i i iP G F  ,1 i u  , 
where 
1 1 0F C G  . 
The verification of the integrity is performed simply by checking the last l  bits 
(where we use l  to denote the length of ICV) of recovered plaintext. If this matches 
the expected value of ICV, the message is regarded as authentic.  
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2.4.2 Efficient error-propagating block chaining (EPBC) 
Zuquete and Guedes [7] proposed Efficient error-propagating block chaining (EPBC) 
as an improved version of IOBC in 1997, and claimed it is not as vulnerable as IOBC 
to known-plaintext forgery attacks. The encryption/decryption algorithm of EPBC is 
almost identical to IOBC except for the function g . EPBC can be used with any block 
cipher. For integrity assurance, an ICV is appended to the plaintext message.  
Description 
EPBC is a mode of operation for an n  -bit block cipher, where n  is even, say 2n m . 
Two secret keys denoted K and 'K are used. One key,K , is used for encryption and 
decryption. The second secret key, 'K , and a sequence number S are used to 
generate a pair of secret n  -bit initial vectors denoted by 
0F and 0G , where 
 '0 KF e S  and  '0 0KG e F . These initial vectors are required for encryption of the 
first plaintext block. 
The EPBC encryption operation is defined as follows:  
1i i iG P F  , 1 i u  , 
 i K iF e G ,1 i u   , 
 1i i iC F g G   , 2 i u  , 
where 
1 1 0C F G   . This process is shown in Fig. 2.15. EPBC has similar encryption 
mechanism to IOBC, except the function g . 
The function g  in EPBC applies a bitwise operation to the two m -bit halves of the n -
bit block. More precisely, suppose X  is an n -bit block, where X L R , L is the 
high order m -bit block and R is the low order m -bit block. Then g is defined as 
follows: 
     g X L R L R   , 
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where  and  denote the bitwise inclusive or and logical and operations 
respectively, and X denotes the bitwise inverse version of X . Note that, this 
function g is not 1-1. Different inputs of the function g can yield the same output. 
For example, (0 0 ) (1 1 ) (1 0 )m m m m m mg g  . 
The decryption operation of IOBC is simply the reverse process of the encryption, as 
follows: 
 1i i iF C g G   , 2 i u  , 
 i K iG d F ,1 i u  , 
1i i iP G F  ,1 i u  , 
where
1 1 0F C G  . 
The verification of integrity is performed simply by checking the last l bits of 
recovered plaintext. If this matches the expected value of ICV, the message is 
regarded as authentic.  
2.4.3 New memory- plaintext ciphertxt block chaining (M-PCBC) 
Plaintext ciphertext block chaining (PCBC) as shown in Fig. 2.17 [4; Chapter 9], is 
based on CBC mode. It is designed to provide extra integrity protection for message 
by adding another XOR operation to each block. This feature allows PCBC to detect 
modifications in ciphertext. However, Kohl [24] discovered that the integrity of 
plaintext cipher block chaining (PCBC) can be easily breached by swapping two 
consecutive ciphertext blocks, which will not propagate any modification to the 
following blocks.  A modified algorithm of PCBC, namely new memory-PCBC (M-PCBC) 
is proposed by Sierra et al. [8] to provide stronger integrity service. The integrity is 
still protected by appending a fixed plaintext block (the ICV) at the end of the 
message. The plaintext is divided into blocks of the same length as defined by the 
selected block cipher. Those blocks are encrypted separately using the same secret 
key and encryption algorithm. To verify the integrity of message, the recipient simply 
checks the value of the last decrypted block. A memory is added in the M-PCBC 
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algorithm to store information about the previous ciphertext block, so that 
alterations of the ciphertext can be propagated to the final block [8].  
 
Figure 2.17 PCBC encryption 
Description 
M-PCBC is a mode of operation of an n -bit block cipher. Suppose the plaintext is 
divided into n -bit blocks. Two n -bit initialisation vectors (IV) are used in this mode, 
denoted 
1IV and 2IV .     
IN M-PCBC, the encryption of the plaintext 1 2, ,..., uP P P is: 
 1 1,i i iM g M C  , 2 i u  , 
 1i K i i iC e P M P   ,1 i u  , 
where 1 2M IV and 0 1P IV . This process is shown in Fig. 2.18. 
 
Figure 2.18 M-PCBC encryption [8] 
Ke
1P
1C
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2P
2C
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3P
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The function g maps the previous n -bit ciphertext block and the previous n -bit 
memory content
1iM   into the next n -bit block iM . Suppose
L R
i i iM M M . Then 
1 1
L L R
i i iM M M    and 1 1
R L R
i i iM C C   . 
The decryption of the ciphertext 
1 2, ,..., uC C C  operates as follows: 
 1 1,i i iM g M C  , 2 i u  , 
  1i K i i iP d C M P   ,1 i u  . 
The integrity of the message is protected by adding a fixed n -bit value at the final 
plaintext block before encryption. As with IOBC and EPBC, the process for verifying 
integrity is by checking the correctness of the ICV of recovered plaintext. 
2.5 Summary 
AE schemes provide confidentiality and integrity to messages. Block cipher 
algorithms can be used to provide confidentiality. MAC algorithms and ICVs can be 
used to provide integrity. There are three approaches to constructing an AE scheme: 
generic composition, one-pass and two-pass. Three one-pass AE proposals: IAPM, 
OBC and OMAC have been endorsed by NIST. OCB is the successor of IAPM mode. 
OCB and OMAC have been proved vulnerable to collision attacks. The three one-pass 
AE schemes, EPBC, IOBC and M-PCBC that we investigate in Chapter 3 all use an 
appended value, ICV (predefined by two parties) to provide integrity protection. 
IOBC and EPBC have similar encryption and decryption operations except for the 
different function g . M-PCBC is the improved version of PCBC to provide stronger 
integrity protection.  
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3. Investigations into forgery attacks on block ciphers using ICVs 
In this chapter, we apply cryptanalytic methods to investigate the integrity assurance 
mechanism of the three cross chaining block ciphers described in Sect. 2.4: IOBC, 
EPBC and M-PCBC. To enable comparison, we consider also brute force key search 
and brute force attack on the ICV, discussed in Sect. 2.2.2 in the context of a forgery 
attack. Forgeries could involve insertion, deletion, reordering and concatenation of 
ciphertext blocks in those three schemes. A generic forgery attack discussed in this 
section will also be applied to the schemes.  
In his analysis of IOBC, Mitchell proposed a chosen plaintext forgery attack. We show 
that this attack can actually work as a generic attack to the other cross chaining 
cipher modes. 
We review the existing analysis for the three target AE schemes and correct flaws in 
those analyses. The investigation also involves verification through computer 
experiments. We calculate in detail the success probability of this generic forgery 
attack. We also extend the type of attacks for each target scheme.  
We introduce experiments to verify the validity of the proposed forgery attacks 
against the integrity of IOBC, EPBC and M-PCBC. We perform all experiments in C 
code based on publicly available implementations of the AES [25] or DES [26] with 
some minor modifications on the Intel Core i7-3770M 3.40GHZ processor running 
64-bit Windows 7.  We simulated forgery attacks for specific examples. Note that 
attacks on EPBC assume that the values of the inner vectors are known. Knowledge 
of the inner vectors permits those attack approaches to be applied.  
Finally, we also compare the success probabilities of the different attack approaches 
that we have considered in this chapter.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Sect. 3.1 examines and extends the generic 
attack proposed by Mitchell for IOBC to all three ciphers; Sect. 3.2 considers forgery 
attacks on EPBC; Sect. 3.3 discusses forgery attacks on IOBC; Sect. 3.4 presents 
forgery attacks on M-PCBC; Sect. 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
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3.1 Generic weakness 
Mitchell outlined a chosen-plaintext forgery attack in his cryptanalysis of IOBC [27]. 
As will be shown, this approach can actually be applied to all three of the cross 
chaining AE modes (IOBC, EPBC and M-PCBC) investigated in this chapter. The 
method applies to plaintext messages of any length greater than four blocks. It 
requires a large number of messages, each of which has two consecutive plaintext 
blocks in common.  
The chosen-plaintext attack that Mitchell applied depends on a certain probability 
that the inner vectors of two messages are the same when the two ciphertext blocks 
corresponding to the common plaintext blocks in these messages are the same. 
Mitchell conjectured that there is a very high probability that the specific inner 
vectors of two messages are the same when the ciphertext condition is met. We 
show that this attack also can be performed with similar complexity using messages 
with a single plaintext block in common. We investigate the probabilities associated 
with these attacks in detail. 
In this section, firstly, we explain the general attack approach. Secondly, we 
investigate the probability that the specific inner vectors in two messages are the 
same, given the matched ciphertext pairs. Thirdly, we show the success rate of 
generic attack in each case. Finally, we summaries our results. 
3.1.1 Attack approach 
Assume we have two plaintext messages P and 'P , where 1 2, ,..., uP P P P and
' ' ' '
1 2, ,..., tP P P P , and their corresponding ciphertext messages C and
'C , where
1 2, ,..., uC C C C and 
' ' ' '
1 2, ,..., tC C C C . For IOBC and EPBC, suppose
'
i jP P   and 
'
i jC C  for some ( 0 i u  , 0 j t  ). Suppose also that the pair of inner vectors 
( 1iF  and
'
1jF  ) for these two messages are equal. For M-PCBC, suppose
'
1 1i jP P  and
'
i jC C , and that also the corresponding pair of inner vectors ( iM and 
'
jM ) for these 
two messages are equal. In such a case, we can construct a forged ciphertext 
message * * *1 2, ,..., vC C C , through concatenation of the first part of C and the last part 
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of 'C  as shown in Fig. 3.1. That is * * * 1 21 2 1 1, ,,. , ,. ,.... i iC CC C C C  and 
* * * ' ' '
11, ,..., , ,...,j j ti i vC C C CC C   . When the forged ciphertext gets decrypted, the 
recovered plaintext will be ' ' '
1 2 1 1, ,..., , , ,...,i j j tP P P P P P  . This will be accepted as 
genuine by the receiver, because the final ciphertext block will decrypt to the correct 
ICV. 
 
Figure 3.1 The forged message for the generic attack 
For IOBC and EPBC, consider the decryption of *iC . We have: 
* * *
1( )i i iF C g G   (from Sect. 2.4.1) 
                                                   ' 1( )j iC g G    (from above) 
                                                   ' '
1( )j jC g G     
 (by assumption above, we have ' '1 1 1 1( ) ( )i K i K j jG d F d F G      ) 
                                                    '
jF (from Sect. 2.4.1). 
Hence ' ' * *( ) ( )j K j K i iG d F d F G   . Then, we have: 
* * *
1i i iP G F  (from Sect. 2.4.1) 
                                                      '
1j iG F    
                                                      ' '
1j jG F   (by assumption above) 
                                                       = 'jP (from Sect. 2.4.1). 
In terms of M-PCBC, considering the decryption of *iC , we have: 
* * * *
1( )i K i i iP d C M P   (from Sect. 2.4.3) 
                                            ' ' '
1( )K j j jd C M P     (by assumption above) 
Kd
1P
1C
Kd
2P
2C
Kd
1iC 
1iP
'
jC
'
jP
'
1jC 
'
1jP 
'
tC
'
tP
Kd Kd Kd
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                                             '
jP . 
For both cases, ciphertext blocks * * *
1 2 1, ,..., iC C C  will decrypt to 1 2 1, ,..., iP P P . Inner 
vectors *
iF and
*
iG for IOBC and EPBC and 
*
iM for M-PCBC will guarantee the following 
ciphertext blocks * * *
1, ,...,i i vC C C will decrypt to
' ' '
1, ,...,j j tP P P . In particular, the final 
block will decrypt to give the correct ICV.  
 
In his analysis of IOBC, Mitchell [27] claimed that this attack can be applied by setting 
up a large number of messages such that two consecutive plaintext blocks in one 
message also occur consecutively in every other message. That is, an attacker has a 
large number of messages such that '
i jP P and
'
1 1i jP P  , and then looks for 
particular message pairs for which '
i jC C and
'
1 1i jC C   . Mitchell claimed that if
'
i jC C and
'
1 1i jC C  , then the probability that 
'
1 1i jF F  is very high. We will verify 
and qualify this claim in Sect. 3.1.2. 
 
Also, we will show that a similar attack is possible for pairs of messages with a single 
common plaintext block '
i jP P whenever
'
i jC C . This attack can be applied to IOBC, 
EPBC and M-PCBC. For IOBC and EPBC, this attack requires fewer messages than 
Mitchell’s approach to find a pair for which the ciphertext condition is met. However, 
it has a lower probability that the inner vectors will then match as required. 
3.1.2 Probability that inner vectors match 
Suppose the block length for the underlying block cipher is n  bits. We quantify 
Mitchell’s claim regarding the probability that '
1 1i jF F   in the following theorems. 
In the first two theorems, we analyse the case proposed by us, where there are two 
plaintext messages with a common block '
i jP P , for both IOBC and EPBC. The next 
two theorems supply the details of Mitchell’s claims, for the case where the two 
messages have two consecutive common blocks '
i jP P and
'
1 1i jP P  . Again this 
applies to IOBC and EPBC. The final two theorems show the success probability of 
applying Mitchell’s attack and our attack to M-PCBC. 
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Theorem 3.1:  Suppose for IOBC that we have two plaintext messages P and 'P , such 
that '
i jP P . If 
'
i jC C  for the corresponding ciphertexts, then
'
1 1( )i jPr F F  =0.5; 
that is, ' '1 1( | )i j i jPr F F C C   = 0.5. 
Proof: 
Let Adenote the event '
i jC C andB denote the event
'
1 1i jF F  . We wish to show
( | ) 0.5Pr B A  . It is obvious that ( ) 2 nPr B  and ( ) 1 2 nPr B    for two distinct 
randomly chosen message blocks. Also, since
1 1( ) ( )i i i K i iC F g G e P F     
1( ( ))K ig d F and
' ' ' ' ' '
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ( ))j j j K j j K jC F g G e P F g d F        (from Sect. 2.4.1), 
we have ( | ) 1Pr A B  . Now consider ( | )Pr A B : first note that if '
i jC C , then
' '
1 1( ) ( )i j i jF F g G g G    . Now if 
'
1 1i jF F  , then also 1( )i K i iF e P F  
' '
1( )K i j je P F F  ; assuming that 1iF  and
'
1 1j iF F   are chosen at random, there are 
then 2 1n  equally likely values for the difference 'i jF F . Since g is 1-1, as noted in 
Sect. 2.4.1, it follows that ' '1 1 1 1( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )i K i K j jg G g d F g d F g G      . Since 1iF 
and ' 1jF  are chosen independently of the key, it is reasonable to assume that the 
distribution of the difference '1 1( ) ( )i jg G g G  is independent of the distribution of
'
i jF F , from which it follows that (conditional on 
'
1 1i jF F  )
' ' '
1 1( ) ( ( ) ( ))i j i j i jPr C C Pr F F g G g G       
                                       
' '
1 1
0
( ) ( ( ) ( ) )i j i j
d
Pr F F d Pr g G g G d 

       
                                       
'
1 1
0
1
( ( ) ( ) )
2 1
i jn
d
Pr g G g G d 

   

  
                                       
'
1 1
0
1
( ( ) ( ) )
2 1
i jn
d
Pr g G g G d 

   

  
                                       
1
2 1n


. 
We then have 
( ) ( | ) ( ) 1 2 2n nPr AB Pr A B Pr B      , 
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1
( ) ( | ) ( ) (1 2 ) 2
2 1
n n
n
Pr AB Pr A B Pr B      

, 
1( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 2n n nPr A Pr AB Pr AB         , 
and so
1
( ) 2 1
( | )
( ) 2 2
n
n
Pr AB
Pr B A
Pr A

 
   . □ 
 
Theorem 3.2:  Suppose for EPBC that we have two plaintext messages P and 'P , 
such that '
i jP P . If 
'
i jC C  for the corresponding ciphertexts, then
'
1 1( ) 0.5i jPr F F   ; that is,
' '
1 1( | ) 0.5i j i jPr F F C C    . 
Proof: 
The proof is identical to IOBC except that for EPBC, since g is not 1-1, as discussed in 
Sect. 2.4.2, then it is possible that '1 1( ) ( )i jg G g G  , even though
'
1 1i jF F  . In this 
case, we have (again conditional on '1 1i jF F  ) 
' '
1 1
0
1
( ) ( ( ) ( ) )
2 1
i j i jn
d
Pr C C Pr g G g G d 

    

  
                       
1
2 1n


 
 
 
We  then have 
( ) ( | ) ( ) 1 2 2n nPr AB Pr A B Pr B      , 
1
( ) ( | ) ( ) (1 2 ) 2
2 1
n n
n
Pr AB Pr A B Pr B      

, 
1( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 2n n nPr A Pr AB Pr AB         , 
and so
1
( ) 2 1
( | )
( ) 2 2
n
n
Pr AB
Pr B A
Pr A

 
   . □ 
 
Theorem 3.3: Suppose for IOBC that we have two plaintext messages P and 'P , such 
that '
i jP P and
'
1 1i jP P  . If 
'
i jC C  and
'
1 1i jC C  for the corresponding ciphertexts, 
then '1 1( )i jPr F F  =1 2
n ; that is, '1 1( |i jPr F F 
'
i jC C  and
'
1 1)i jC C  =1 2
n . 
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Proof: 
 
Let Abe the event '
i jC C  and
'
1 1i jC C  , and B be the event
'
1 1i jF F  . We wish to 
show ( | ) 1 2 nPr B A   . As before, we have ( ) 2 nPr B  , ( ) 1 2 nPr B   and
( | ) 1Pr A B  .Now consider ( | )Pr A B : the same probabilities in Theorem 3.1 will 
apply for the second block independently of the first block and so the result will be
2( | ) (2 1)nPr A B   . 
 
We have 
( ) ( | ) ( ) 1 2 2n nPr AB Pr A B Pr B      , 
2
1 2
( ) ( | ) ( ) (1 2 )
(2 1) 2 1
n
n
n n
Pr AB Pr A B Pr B

    
 
, 
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 (1 )
2 1 2 1
n
n n
Pr A Pr AB Pr AB     
 
, 
( )
( | ) 2 (2 1) 1 2
( )
n n nPr ABPr B A
Pr A
      .□ 
 
Theorem 3.4: Suppose for EPBC that we have two plaintext messages P and 'P , such 
that '
i jP P and
'
1 1i jP P  . If 
'
i jC C  and
'
1 1i jC C  for the corresponding ciphertexts, 
then '1 1( ) 1 2
n
i jPr F F

    ; that is,
'
1 1( |i jPr F F 
'
i jC C  and
'
1 1)i jC C  1 2
n  . 
 
Proof: 
 
Let Abe the event 'i jC C  and
'
1 1i jC C  , and B be the event
'
1 1i jF F  . We wish to 
show ( | ) 1 2 nPr B A   . As before, we have ( ) 2 nPr B  , ( ) 1 2 nPr B   and
( | ) 1Pr A B  .Now consider ( | )Pr A B , the same probabilities in Theorem 3.2 will 
apply for the second block independently of the first block and so the result will be 
2( | ) (2 1)nPr A B   . 
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We have 
( ) ( | ) ( ) 1 2 2n nPr AB Pr A B Pr B      , 
2
1 2
( ) ( | ) ( ) (1 2 )
(2 1) 2 1
n
n
n n
Pr AB Pr A B Pr B

    
 
, 
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 (1 )
2 1 2 1
n
n n
Pr A Pr AB Pr AB     
 
, 
( )
( | ) 2 (2 1) 1 2
( )
n n nPr ABPr B A
Pr A
      .□ 
 
For M-PCBC, we consider two different approaches for finding messages with 
'
1 1i jP P   and 
'
i jM M . These correspond roughly to Mitchell’s approach and our 
approach for the cases of IOBC and EPBC discussed above. 
Theorem 3.5:  Suppose for M-PCBC that we have two plaintext messages P and 'P , 
such that '
1 1i jP P   and 
'
i jP P . If 
'
i jC C , then
'( ) 1i jPr M M  ; that is,
' '( | ) 1i j i jPr M M C C   . 
Proof: 
Given that  1i K i i iC e P M P    and  ' ' ' ' 1j K j j jC e P M P     (from Sect. 2.4.3), 
we have directly that 1 ( )i i i K iM P P d C    and
' ' ' '
1 ( )j j j K jM P P d C    , and 
hence the result follows directly. That is ' '( | ) 1i j i jPr M M C C   .□ 
Theorem 3.6:  Suppose for M-PCBC that we have two plaintext messages P and 'P , 
such that '
1 1i jP P  . If 
'
1 1i jC C  , then
' /2( ) 2 ni jPr M M
  ; that is,
' ' /2
1 1( | ) 2
n
i j i jPr M M C C

    . 
Proof: 
Note first that L R
i i iM M M ,
' ' 'L R
j j jM M M . If
'
1 1i jC C  , we automatically have 
'R R
i jM M , since 1 1
R L R
i i iM C C   and 
' ' '
1 1
R L R
j j jM C C   (from Sect. 2.4.3). Now 
consider whether 'L L
i jM M : this occurs exactly when
' '
1 1 1 1
L R L R
i i j jM M M M       , 
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which occurs with probability /22 n for randomly chosen iM and
'
jM , and the result 
follow directly.  That is, ' ' /21 1( | ) 2
n
i j i jPr M M C C

    . □ 
3.1.3 The success rate of the attacks  
For IOBC, assume two plaintext messages P and 'P are constructed with 'i jP P and
'
1 1i jP P  . Given this condition, from Theorem 3.3, the probability of finding that the 
corresponding ciphertextsC and 'C  have '
i jC C and
'
1 1i jC C   is 
1 2(2 1)n n   . By 
the birthday paradox, we need about /22n messages to find a pair of messages P and
'P  with 'i jC C and
'
1 1i jC C  , so that we can perform the forgery attack discussed 
in Section 3.1.1. The number of pairs in a set of /22n messages is /2 /2 12 (2 1) / 2 2n n n  . 
Thus the complexity of the comparisons to find 'i jC C and
'
1 1i jC C  is roughly 
12n . 
Assuming that such a pair of messages has been found, there is a 1 2 n chance to 
have '
1 1i jF F  , which almost guarantees a forgery. 
 
For IOBC, assume two messages P and 'P  are constructed with '
i jP P .  Given this 
condition, from Theorem 3.1, the probability of finding that the corresponding 
ciphertexts C and 'C  have '
i jC C is
12 n  . By the birthday paradox, we need about 
( 1)/22 n messages to find a pair of message P and 'P with '
i jC C , so that we can 
perform the attack discussed in Section 3.1.1. The complexity of the comparisons to 
find 'i jC C is then 
( 1)/2 ( 1)/2 22 (2 1) / 2 2n n n    . Assuming that such a pair of 
messages has been found, there is a 50% chance to have '
1 1i jF F  , which gives us a 
50% chance to run a successful forgery. 
 
For IOBC, comparing the approaches involving a single repeated plaintext block and 
two repeated plaintext blocks, the former one only needs half of the comparisons 
that are needed for the latter one to find a ciphertext collision, but that only gives us 
a 50% chance to run a successful forgery. Therefore these two approaches actually 
have a similar complexity of performing a successful chosen-plaintext attack. Both 
approaches are only slightly better than exhaustive key search. 
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For EPBC, the calculation complexities are identical to IOBC in each case but 
probabilities of success may be higher. This is because the g  function in EPBC is not 
1-1, which slightly increases the probability of an inner vector collision of two 
messages when the ciphertext condition is met. 
 
For M-PCBC, assume two plaintext messages P and 'P are constructed with '1 1i jP P 
and '
i jP P . From the structure of M-PCBC, we argue directly that 
'( )i jPr C C  is 
then 2 n , since  1i K i i iC e P M P    and  ' ' ' ' 1j K j j jC e P M P    and iM and 'jM  
can be assumed to vary independently of one another. By the birthday paradox, we 
need about /22n messages to find a pair of messages P and 'P  with 'i jC C , so that 
we can perform the forgery attack discussed in Section 3.1.1. The number of pairs in 
a set of /22n messages is /2 /2 12 (2 1) / 2 2n n n  . Thus the complexity of finding 
messages where 'i jC C is roughly 
12n . Assuming that such a pair of messages has 
been found, there is a 100% chance to have '
1 1i jM M  , so a forgery is guaranteed.  
 
For M-PCBC, assume two messages P and 'P  are constructed with '1 1i jP P  .  Again 
we argue directly from the structure of M-PCBC that the probability of finding that 
the corresponding ciphertexts C and 'C  have '
1 1i jC C  is 2
n . As above, the 
complexity of finding messages where '1 1i jC C  is roughly 
12n . But the success 
probability of the forgery in this case is very low ( /22 n ) when the ciphertext 
condition is met in a pair of messages.  
3.1.4 Summary 
In this section, we point out that the chosen-plaintext forgery attack presented by 
Mitchell in his cryptanalysis of IOBC can actually be applied to all three of the cross 
chaining AE modes (IOBC, EPBC and M-PCBC). We first explained this attack 
approach, and then calculated the probability of successfully performing this attack. 
For IOBC, Mitchell had not calculated the probability but conjectured that the 
probability is very high. We determined these probabilities and confirmed this 
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conjecture for IOBC and also for EPBC.  We also showed that Mitchell’s attack 
applied to M-PCBC has 100% success probability.  
We proposed a similar attack on IOBC and EPBC where we find one common 
ciphertext block in two messages rather than two consecutive common ciphertext 
blocks. This has similar complexity to Mitchell’s proposal of performing a successful 
chosen-plaintext attack.  We also applied this attack to M-PCBC. The probability of a 
successful forgery attack on M-PCBC is significantly reduced when compared to the 
probability of successful attacks on IOBC and EPBC. 
The above attacks are chosen-plaintext attacks where we can manipulate the 
messages. In a more realistic scenario, if it is a known-plaintext attack, we just 
observe which plaintext messages are the same. In such a case, the scenario in 
Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.6 with a single repeated block in multiple 
messages is more likely to occur than the scenario in Theorem 3.3, Theorem 3.4 or 
Theorem 3.5, where we need to find two consecutive blocks repeated in multiple 
messages. IOBC and EPBC are more susceptible to a known plaintext attack than M-
PCBC, since the success rate in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 for IOBC and EPBC 
respectively are much higher than that in Theorem 3.6 for M-PCBC. 
3.2 Analysis of EPBC 
Recently, Mitchell analysed EPBC, pointing out a weakness in the integrity 
mechanism and proposed a forgery attack based on this weakness [28]. He claimed 
that knowing sufficient plaintext/ciphertext pairs permitted the inner vectors, used 
to conceal plaintext patterns, to be disclosed with very high probability. Once these 
inner vectors were known, a forgery could be constructed. However, we show that 
his calculation is inaccurate and the probability of a successful forgery is no better 
than guessing the ICV.  
In this section, firstly, we review Mitchell’s analysis, point out the flaw in his analysis 
and revise the success rate of his attack. Secondly, we propose alternative attacks to 
break the integrity mechanism of EPBC and compare the success rates of all attacks. 
Thirdly, we draw a conclusion for this section. 
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3.2.1 Review of Mitchell’s analysis 
Mitchell’s attack [28] on EPBC aims to forge a ciphertext message in such a way that 
the forgery is not detected by the integrity mechanism. This is an existential forgery 
rather than a selective forgery. In order to achieve this, the attacker has to construct 
a message such that the last ciphertext block will decrypt to the correct ICV value. 
The inner vectors, 
iF and iG , in EPBC ensure integrity protection by propagating 
inaccurate decryptions from any tampered ciphertext blocks through to the end [7]. 
Zuquete and Guedes [7] note that, to achieve a forgery, ciphertext blocks must be 
constructed to adjust the values of the inner vectors during the decryption process, 
to permit correct decryption of the ICV. 
 The function g  in EPBC is critical in protecting the contents of the inner vectors from 
discovery (see Sect. 2.4.2). Mitchell’s analysis is composed of two stages: firstly 
investigating the vulnerability of the function g which can be used to reveal the inner 
vectors, and then using this knowledge to construct a message which will not be 
detected as a forgery by the integrity mechanism of EPBC. 
3.2.1.1 Mitchell’s Analysis of function g 
This stage aims to use knowledge of a series of plaintext and ciphertext pairs to 
disclose the value of the inner vectors, 
iG . Knowledge of iG permits a forgery attack 
on EPBC mode. We discuss the process of constructing a forged ciphertext in Sect. 
3.2.1.3. 
Revealing the contents of the inner vectors
iG is based on the properties of the 
function g . Suppose X is an n -bit block, where X L R , and 
1 2( , ,..., )mL x x x and 
1 2( , ,..., )m m m mR x x x   . Also, suppose 
' '( )g X L R  where ' ' ' '1 2( , ,..., )mL x x x and
' ' ' '
1 2( , ,..., )m m m mR x x x   . Because this function applies bitwise operations to the two 
m -bit halves ( L andR ) of each n -bit block, it can be treated asm parallel operations 
on pairs of bits ( ,j j mx x  ), where jx is the j -th bit of the block and j mx  is the ( j m )-
th bit of the block, for 1,...,j m . Table 3.1 shows the set B of possible output pairs 
( ' ',j j mx x  ) that can be obtained after applying the function g to each possible set A of 
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input pairs ( ,j j mx x  ). We group sets in column A by the number of alternatives in 
each set. We will explain later why group 2 is separated into 2a and 2b. 
 
Table 3.1 Input/output possibilities for the function g [20] 
Assume that a set of staggered plaintext/ciphertext blocks 1 2 3( , ),( , ),...i i i iC P C P   are 
known by the attacker. Assume also ( ,j j mx x  ) is a bit pair in inner vector 1iG  , where
j  1 j m  is a randomly chosen bit position in an n -bit block. There are four 
possible values for this bit pair (listed as group 4 in Table 3.1). Mitchell [28] notes 
that the set of output bit pairs from the function g can never include the specific bit 
pair (0, 1). Thus, the pair in position ( ,j j mx x  ) of  1ig G  can only take one of the 
values listed (for group 4) in column B of Table 3.1. Because of this, we can also 
narrow possible bit pairs in position ( ,j j mx x  ) in  1 1 1i i i iG P C g G      from four 
to three, where the bits in position ( ,j j mx x  ) of 1i iC P determine which set of three 
pairs is relevant in each individual case. Similarly, when 1iG   runs through the 
function g , either three (1/2 chance) or two (1/2 chance) alternatives result for the 
bit pairs in position ( ,j j mx x  ) in  1ig G  (column B in group 3 ).  
If the bit pair in position ( ,j j mx x  ) of  1ig G  has two alternatives, so will the bit pair 
in this position in  3 3 2 1i i i iG P C g G      .  Mitchell [28] argues that the output 
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bit pairs in  3ig G  will then either have two alternatives (5/6 chance) or one 
alternative (1/6 chance). Finally, if there is one alternative in the input, the output 
pairs of the function g have only one alternative. According to this argument, the   
possible alternatives for each bit pair in
2 1i vG   will eventually be reduced to a single 
(known) alternative if sufficiently many staggered plaintext/ciphertext pairs
1 2 2 2 1, ,..., ,i i i v i vC P C P     are known. 
Based on Table 3.1, Mitchell [28] proposed a matrix (shown in Fig. 3.2) for the 
probability of transitions between different numbers of possible bit pairs remaining 
at each stage.  The entries in row i and column j in the matrix denote the probability 
that there are j possible output bit pairs from the function g , given that there were i
possible input bit pairs. For example, for a set of three input bit pairs (3rd row) the 
possible output will be either three bit pairs (3rd column) with 1/2 chance or two bit 
pairs (2nd column) with 1/2 chance.  
 
Figure 3.2 Mitchell’s transition probability matrix [20] 
If we iterate the above matrixv times, the bottom left entry of the resulting power 
matrix give us the probability of obtaining a single pair of bits as the possible output 
of g after v iterations [28]. Note that v also indicates the number of staggered 
plaintext/ciphertext pairs required to iterate this analysis v times. 
Using this approach, Mitchell calculated the probability of knowing a single pair of 
bits and the corresponding probability of revealing a whole 128-bit block for various 
values of v . We reproduce Mitchell’s information in Table 3.2; here p  denotes the 
probability of a unique possibility for a single bit pair and q  denotes the probability 
of a unique possibility for a 128-bit block. For instance, with knowledge of 30 
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staggered pairs of plaintext/ciphertext blocks, Mitchell claims there is a 0.99241 
chance that a bit pair will be known.  
Mitchell used these probabilities as the basis for an attack. We discuss the 
methodology in Sect. 3.2.1.3. 
 
Table 3.2 Probability of a unique possibility for a bit pair and a 128-bit block [20] 
3.2.1.2 The flaw in Mitchell’s analysis 
In Mitchell’s attack, determining the inner vectors (
iF and iG ) is critical to the success 
of the forgery attack. We reviewed the process of obtaining the inner vectors to 
verify the validity of it. It turns out that Mitchell’s attack cannot completely reveal 
the inner vectors of EPBC, regardless of the amount of known plaintext/ciphertext 
pairs. In fact, there are still two alternatives remaining for every bit pair of inner 
vectors, rather than one, namely 642 alternatives for a 128-bit block cipher. 
Accordingly the forgery attack has a much lower chance of success than Mitchell 
claimed.  
The thick line in Table 3.1 divides the input/output possibilities for g into two 
separate groups. We consider specifically the cases where there are two possible 
input pairs, and divide this into two groups: 2a and 2b. Note that it is not possible to 
obtain an input set in group 2a as the output from applying g to any of the sets in 
group 2b. Consider again that  1 1 1i i i iG P C g G     ; for any given bit position 
( ,j j mx x  ) in 1iG  , the relevant pair in 1i iP C  must be XORed to each of the possible 
output pairs in  1ig G  . Now every set in group 2b consists of one pair in which the 
two bits are identical and one pair in which the two bits are different. Regardless of 
which set we choose from group 2b and which bit pair is XORed to both of these, the 
resulting set of bit pairs will have the same property and must therefore belong to 
group 2b as well. Therefore the possibilities which are above the splitting line are 
what we can obtain for each bit pair of inner vectors. Thus, in this attack, for every 
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pair of bits, instead of four alternatives we can have two (from group 2b). The 
remaining groups in Table 3.1 cannot be obtained regardless of the amount of 
known plaintext/ciphertext pairs.  
Based on this version of Table 3.1, we present a new theoretical transition 
probability matrix as shown in Figure 3.3. The entry in the i row and the j column of 
the matrix again denotes the probability that the number of input pairs i will 
generate the number of output pairs j . The labels 2a and 2b in the matrix relate to 
the two rows below the thick line and the four rows above the thick line in Table 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.3 Theoretical transition probability matrix 
Although it is not possible to uniquely determine the inner vectors 
iF and iG  by using 
known plaintext/ciphetext pairs, we can reduce the number of possible values for 
each inner vector. For example, for a 128-bit block cipher, the number of possible 
values can be reduced from 644 alternatives to 642 alternatives, so the probability to 
reveal each inner vector is 642 . The chance we guess correctly for the whole final 
inner vector block is very low, although it is dramatically better than the probability 
of guessing the entire contents of this block ( 1282 ). 
By iterating the corrected matrix (Fig. 3.2) v times, the (4,2b) entry of the resulting 
power matrix gives us the probability pof obtaining two alternatives as the possible 
output of g after v iterations. This probability can then be used to determine the 
corresponding probability q that an n -bit block has only 2n alternatives. Table 3.3 
lists the values of p  andq for chosen values of v and n =128. For example, after 10 
iterations, the probability p  that there will only be two alternatives remaining for a 
45 
 
bit pair is 0.99805; for a complete block of 128 bits, the probability q that there will 
be only two alternatives for each pair is 0.882389.  
 
Table 3.3 Probability of two alternatives for a bit pair and for every pair in a 128-bit 
block 
3.2.1.3 Mitchell’s Forgery Attack-deletion 
Mitchell [28] explains how a forged ciphertext message can be derived by controlled 
deletion of blocks in a genuine encrypted message. Blocks can be deleted anywhere 
between the first ciphertext block and the second last ciphertext block, provided the 
ciphertext block after the deleted blocks is suitably modified. The modified message 
block must permit recovery of the correct inner vectors for the decryption process of 
the following ciphertext block, so that the decrypted ICV value remains unchanged 
[20]. 
To perform this forgery, we suppose the attacker knows the inner vectors
sG and 2uG  , 
for1 s u  , of a ciphertext message 
1 2, ,..., uC C C (Mitchell actually suggests using 
two separate messages but the same process applies in both scenarios). The forged 
ciphertext message ' ' '1 2 2, ,... sC C C  ( 2s u  ) is constructed as follows [28]: 
'
i iC C  (1 i s  ), 
'
1 1 2( ) g( )s u u sC C g G G     ,  
and ' 1s uC C  . 
The above forged message will generate the correct ICV when it is decrypted by the 
receiver. Note that there is no flaw in Mitchell’s attack algorithm. However, our 
argument above about the probability of revealing inner vectors shows that this 
attack is only a probabilistic attack.  
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Attack Application 
We demonstrate this attack for a seven block ciphertext. Assume we have an 
encrypted message 
1 2 7, ,...,C C C  and the inner vectors 3G and 5G are known. Also 
assume that the final plaintext block,
7P , is the ICV. 
Following Mitchell [28], we now construct a forged ciphertext by deleting two 
ciphertext blocks and modifying the blocks after the deletion as follows: 
* *
1 2 3 4 5, , , ,C C C C C , 
where    *4 6 5 3C C g G g G   ,  
and *5 7C C . 
Here, we have deleted blocks
4C and 5C from the authentic ciphertext message and 
then modified 6C and left 7C unchanged. As shown in Fig. 3.4, 
*
4C  generates inner 
vector
6F  (    
*
4 3 6 5 6C g G C g G F    ), so that 6F  after decryption process yields
6G . With these inner vectors, the last forged ciphertext block 
*
5C will generate the 
correct value for the ICV.  
 
Figure 3.4 EPBC decryption of forged ciphertext message 
Experimental validation 
We simulated the above forgery attack for a specific example. Note that this attack 
approach assumes that Mitchell’s claims regarding obtaining the values of the inner 
vectors are valid. Knowledge of the inner vectors permits this attack approach to be 
applied. Assuming the inner vectors are known, the attack proceeds as follows. 
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1. We compiled a plaintext with seven 128-bit message blocks, as shown in 
Table 3.4.  
2. Using EPBC mode with 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher, we ran the 
EPBC encryption operation to encrypt this plaintext and obtained the 
ciphertext shown in Table 3.5.  
3. We constructed a forged message as described above. The fraudulent 
message is shown in Table 3.6 (the 4th and 5th ciphertext blocks have been 
deleted, and the 6th ciphertext block has been modified to become the new 
fourth block).   
4. When we decrypt the forged message, we obtain a new shorter message 
with the same last message block as the original plaintext, as shown in Table 
3.7.  
01010101010101010101010101010101 
000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51 
f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6 
9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d 
603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 
Table 3.4 Experimental plaintext message (EPBC-deletion) 
43c3033ca7bf6f0a851ed410baa82273 
9a0dd46bf2c07494a0fa9b27bb6f59ef 
6f7ff69f4c47bbb1fecdb0aef90cc322 
65e853974dfc9fff620865312eec755a 
f30d93f311add070815d1b6a9db95153 
327034f1b4528c933d55df6b4a66cab3 
8e55a18f38a42fdb46133ba5e55d3d88 
Table 3.5 Experimental ciphertext message (EPBC-deletion) 
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43c3033ca7bf6f0a851ed410baa82273 
9a0dd46bf2c07494a0fa9b27bb6f59ef 
6f7ff69f4c47bbb1fecdb0aef90cc322 
A2752be12c128295d75deeddc757db83 
8e55a18f38a42fdb46133ba5e55d3d88 
Table 3.6 The forged message (EPBC-deletion) 
01010101010101010101010101010101 
000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
c1ce77b23371fc648798dcc2a39d0c85 
603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 
Table 3.7 Decrypted forged ciphertecxt (EPBC-deletion) 
Revised success rate of attack 
We assume the block length of the underlying cipher is 128 bits. To obtain a 
successful forgery, Mitchell’s attack claimed that with the knowledge of over 100 
consecutive plaintext/ciphertext blocks ( v >50), the inner vectors
iG  would be 
revealed with very high probability [28]. However, from Sect. 3.2.1.2, the number of 
possible values for each inner vector 
iG  can only be reduced to
642 alternatives. Since 
the deletion attack as described above requires knowing two
iG values, the attack 
can only generate a potential forgery that has a probability of 1282 of being accepted 
by the receiver, which is in contrast with Mitchell’s claim that the forgery is 
guaranteed to succeed. Assume the length of ICV is 128 bits. This attack is not useful 
as the success probability is no better than randomly guessing any message and 
hoping that the final block decrypts to give the correct ICV.  
3.2.2 Other attacks 
In this section, we first investigate exhaustive key search to break the integrity 
mechanism of EPBC. Recall that EPBC uses two keys, 'K andK . In the following we 
suppose that the block length of the underlying cipher is 128 bits and that this cipher 
uses 128-bit keys. We first consider exhaustive search of both keys. Second, we 
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investigate brute force attack on the ICV. Third, we propose an alternative approach 
to launch a forgery attack based on the probability to reveal the inner vectors. It is 
still only a probabilistic attack, with the same probability of success as Mitchell’s 
forgery attack.  
3.2.2.1 Exhaustive key search 
EPBC uses two secret keys. Key 'K is used to firstly encrypt a sequence number S to 
obtain
0F , and then encrypt 0F  to obtain 0G . Key K  is used to encrypt iG  to obtain
iF  for each message block. In the following analysis, we first consider an attack to 
both keys, and then consider possible attacks involving each key separately. Suppose
S is known to the public and a number of pairs of plaintext/ciphertext blocks are 
known to the attacker.  
Exhaustive key attack on both 'K and K  
There are a few different ways that exhaustive key search can be done on both keys. 
The simplest approach is a ciphertext only attack where we guess both keys and 
decrypt the ciphertext to see whether it gives recognisable plaintext. Depending on 
the message format, this may require decryption of several blocks of ciphertext for 
each key pair. 
Another approach is to assume the first three plaintext/ciphertext pairs are known. If 
the attacker guesses a value for key 'K from 1282 possible values and key K likewise, 
he can decrypt the ciphertext and check whether the three known successive 
plaintext blocks match with the corresponding recovered three plaintext blocks to 
find the  correct 'K and K . On average, the attacker will find at least 1282
combinations of 'K andK getting a match for the first plaintext/ciphertext pairs. 
Checking the next two decryptions should guarantee that only the correct pair, 'K
andK , will remain.  
In both approaches, exhaustively guessing both keys requires 2562  guesses. Checking 
each of these guesses will require at least one decryption, so the complexity will be 
around 2562 . Knowing both 'K andK allows the attacker to decrypt all ciphertext 
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messages and impersonate either sender or receiver in communication with the 
other party.   
Exhaustive key attack on 'K  
Assume the attacker knows at least the first two plaintext/ciphertext pairs. If key 'K
is known to the attacker, he can directly compute initial vectors
0F and 0G in order, 
and then reveal inner vectors
1G and 2G by using the knowledge of their 
corresponding plaintext/ciphertext pairs. After that, a forgery attack can be 
conducted by deleting ciphertext 
2C without changing the ICV as discussed in Sect. 
3.2.1.3. Note that, the more consecutive plaintext/ciphertext pairs are known by the 
attacker, the more ciphertext blocks can be deleted. To apply exhaustive key search 
to recover key 'K , the probability is 1282 . In order to verify the correctness of his 
guess for key 'K , the attacker needs to try every possible key and generate 
corresponding forgeries till the receiver accepts the forgery.  
Exhaustive key attack on K  
Assume the attacker knows three consecutive plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Recall that 
each output bit pair of the function g can only have three possible values. A 128-bit 
block has 64 bit pairs. Therefore, there are 643 possible values for an entire block of 
output from g . If the attacker guesses keyK , he can pick a value for 
iF  from those
643 alternatives and decrypt iF with key K to obtain iG , then compute 1iF 
(
1 1 ( )i i iF C g G   ) and encrypt 1iF  to gain 1iG  , and then compare the value of 1iG   
to ' 1 1i i iG P F   . On average, the attacker will find
643 keys for which at least one 
1iG  and
'
1iG   are matching. After that, the attacker performs another loop to 
compare the values of 2iG  and
'
2iG  to find out which match is correct. The chance of 
a false key giving a correct match is negligible at this step. Thereafter, the forgery 
attack discussed in Sect. 3.2.1.3 can be applied.  
To work out the keyK , the attacker needs a ciphertext block (
iC ) to know the 
alternatives for
iF . Then he can use the next known block pairs ( 1iP and 1iC  ) to find a 
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matching pair of inner vectors (
1iG  and
'
1iG  ) and the third known block pairs ( 2iP
and
2iC  ) to check the whether the corresponding inner vectors are matching ( 2iG 
and ' 2iG  ).The attacker need to examine 
643  values of iF to all
1282  possible keys to 
find 643 combinations and then perform another 643 comparisons to find the correct 
key. Hence, with the knowledge of three plaintext/ciphertext pairs, the complexity of 
working out the key K is roughly 64 128 64 2313 2 2 3 2    encryption/decryption 
operations. The knowledge of key K and inner vectors guarantees the attacker to 
mount a successful forgery attack. 
3.2.2.2 Brute force of ICV 
The ICV is concatenated at the end of plaintext message, and the resulting string is 
encrypted. We assume the last l bits of the ciphertext are the encrypted ICV. A naive 
approach to message forgery is to choose any value we like for the forged ciphertext 
and hope that the last ciphertext block decrypts to a block where the last l bits form 
the correct ICV. The probability of brute force ICV thus is 2 l which depends on the 
length of ICV. If l <128 bits then this approach has higher success probability than 
Mitchell’s forgery attack or brute force guessing of 'K . Otherwise the probability of 
guessing the encrypted ICV is at best the same as these attacks. 
3.2.2.3 Forgery attack-insertion 
Instead of deleting ciphertext blocks, it is also possible to construct a fraudulent 
message by inserting certain ciphertext blocks between any two consecutive blocks 
of the ciphertext message. The inner vectors produced by the last inserted block 
must be equal to the value of inner vectors generated by the genuine ciphered 
message block immediately before the inserted ciphertext blocks. In such case, the 
ciphertext block after the inserted ciphertext block will receive the same inner 
vectors yielded by its authentic previous ciphertext blocks. Therefore, no error will 
propagate to the last ciphertext block, and the decrypted ICV is still unaffected.  
As mentioned in Sect. 3.2.1.3, this attack is still only a probabilistic attack. We 
suppose that the opponent knows an encrypted message 1 2, ,..., uC C C and the 
corresponding inner vectors sF and sG , for some1 s u  . The controlled ciphertext 
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blocks, ranging from a single block to 2u distinct blocks, can be inserted between any 
two ciphertext blocks between the first and the last two blocks. There areu different
iF and iG , so 
2u blocks of distinct combination of iF and iG can be constructed. 
Insert a single ciphertext block 
We define the forged ciphertext message as follows: 
* * * * *
1 1 1 1,..., , , ,...s s s uC C C C C   ,  
where  * 1 1s s sC g G F   is the inserted ciphertext block with1 1s u   , 
*
i iC C , 
( 1 i s  ) and *
1j jC C  ,  1 1s j u    . We suppose
*
iF and
*
iG are the inner 
vectors of the fraudulent message. Then we have *i iF F  and
*
i iG G (1 i s  ), 
where
iF and iG are the inner vectors of authentic ciphertext message. In order to 
keep the ICV unchanged after the decryption process, the inner vectors generated by 
the inserted ciphertext block *sC   1 1s u    must be equal to the inner vectors 
yielded by the ciphertext message block * 1sC  .  So we must have
*
1s sF F  ; the other 
inner vectors *sG  produced during the decryption process will then equal to 1sG  . 
When we have the inserted message block  * 1 1s s sC g G F   , we have 
 * * * 1s s sF C g G   (from Sect. 2.4.1) 
                                                     *1 1 1s s sg G F g G      
                                                  1sF  (since
*
1 1s sG G  ), 
and therefore  * * 1s K s sG d F G   as required. Fig. 3.5 demonstrates how to insert a 
ciphertext message block ( *sC ) while leaving the ICV unchanged. 
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Figure 3.5 EPBC decryption of forged ciphertext message (insert one ciphertext 
block) 
We need an inner vector
iG and its deciphered value iF  to complete this attack. To 
find the correct values of these inner vectors we have to check up to 642  possibilities. 
Therefore, the complexity of successfully applying this attack is 1282 , the same as 
Mitchell’s. It is worth noting that the attack will perform in the same way, if the 
inserted ciphertext block is duplicated multiple times in the same insertion spot.  
Experimental validation 
We simulated the above forgery attack for a specific example. Note that this attack 
approach assumes that Mitchell’s claims regarding obtaining the values of the inner 
vectors are valid. Knowledge of the inner vectors permits this attack approach to be 
applied. Assuming the inner vectors are known, the attack proceeds as follows. 
1. We compiled a plaintext with seven 128-bit message blocks considering last 
blocks as the ICV, as shown in Table 3.8.  
2. Using EPBC mode with 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher, we ran the 
EPBC encryption operation to encrypt this plaintext and obtained the 
ciphertext shown in Table3.9.  
3. We constructed a forged message as described above. The fraudulent 
message is shown in Table 3.10 (a new ciphertext block was inserted after the 
4th ciphertext blocks to become the new fifth block).   
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4. When we decrypt the forged message, we obtain a new message with the 
same last message block as the original plaintext, as shown in Table 3.11.  
01010101010101010101010101010101 
000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51 
f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6 
9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d 
603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 
Table 3.8 Experimental plaintext message (EPBC-insertion part 1) 
43c3033ca7bf6f0a851ed410baa82273 
9a0dd46bf2c07494a0fa9b27bb6f59ef 
6f7ff69f4c47bbb1fecdb0aef90cc322 
65e853974dfc9fff620865312eec755a 
f30d93f311add070815d1b6a9db95153 
327034f1b4528c933d55df6b4a66cab3 
8e55a18f38a42fdb46133ba5e55d3d88 
Table 3.9 Experimental ciphertext message (EPBC-insertion part 1) 
43c3033ca7bf6f0a851ed410baa82273 
9a0dd46bf2c07494a0fa9b27bb6f59ef 
6f7ff69f4c47bbb1fecdb0aef90cc322 
65e853974dfc9fff620865312eec755a 
a56f9f9fb55c1b9dfdb1f6a6aa67c770 
f30d93f311add070815d1b6a9db95153 
327034f1b4528c933d55df6b4a66cab3 
8e55a18f38a42fdb46133ba5e55d3d88 
Table 3.10 The forged message (EPBC-insertion part 1) 
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01010101010101010101010101010101 
000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51 
a57dbf1ff7581b98025c29d9179c388a 
f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6 
9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d 
603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 
Table 3.11 Decrypted forged ciphertext (EPBC-insertion part 1) 
Insert multiple ciphertext blocks 
We define the forged ciphertext message as follows: 
* * * *
1 1,..., ,..., ,...,s s t u tC C C C   , 
where * * 1,...,s s tC C   ,  
*
1s s vC g G F  and  
*
1 1s t v sC g G F    , are the inserted 
ciphertext blocks  21 ,1s u t u    , where vF and vG are the inner vectors of 
authentic ciphertext
1 2, ,..., uC C C , for some 1 v u  , 
*
i iC C , ( 1 i s  ) and 
*
j j tC C  ,  1s t j u t     . We suppose
*
iF and
*
iG are the inner vectors of 
decrypted fraudulent message. Then deriving from the definition we have *i iF F  
and *i iG G (1 i s  ), where iF and iG are the inner vectors of authentic ciphertext 
message. In order to gain an ICV without any alteration after decryption process, the 
inner vectors generated by the ciphertext block * 1s tC    must be equal to the inner 
vectors yielded by the ciphertext block * 1sC  . Hence we must have
*
1 1s t sF F   ; the 
other inner vector * 1s tG    produced during the decryption process will then equal to
1sG  . When we have the inserted ciphertext blocks  
*
x v vC g G F  , 
( 1s x s t    ), there are u  different internal values vF and vG , we can randomly 
build up 2u different *xC available for the insertion. We have 
 
56 
 
 * * *x x xF C g G  (from Sect.2.4.1) 
                                                        *v v xg G F g G      
                                                     
vF (choose
*
x vG G ), 
It is worth noting that the first inserted ciphertext block *sC and the last inserted 
ciphertext block * 1s tC   are controlled with special form. Specifically, 
 * 1s s vC g G F  and  
*
1 1s t v sC g G F    . When we put 
*
1s tC    into above equation, 
we have * 1 1s t sF F   and
*
1 1s t sG G   . Then 
*
s tG  ( sG ) will accept correct inner vectors 
and no error will generate and propagate to the last ciphertext block. Therefore the 
value of ICV will remain unchanged after the last ciphertext block is decrypted. Fig. 
3.6 demonstrates how to insert multiple ciphertext blocks ( *sC ,…,
*
1s tC   ) remaining 
the ICV unchanged. 
 
Figure 3.6 EPBC decryption of forged ciphertext message (insert multiple ciphertext 
blocks) 
In this attack, each inserted ciphertext block involves the knowledge of an inner 
vector iG and an inner vector iF . Recall that the number of possible value for each 
inner vector iG can only be reduced to
642 alternatives, so that the number of possible 
values for each inner vector iF can only be
642  as well ( i i iF G P  ).  Thus, there is a 
1282 chance to insert a useful ciphertext block. We need at least to insert two 
ciphertext blocks ( *sC and
*
1s tC   ), which has a probability of 
2562 being suitable, to 
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achieve the recovery of correct inner vector of the decryption process. The more 
distinct blocks that are inserted between *sC and
*
1s tC   , the lower the success 
probability of the attack.   
Experimental validation  
We simulated the above forgery attack for a specific example. Note that this attack 
approach assumes that Mitchell’s claims regarding obtaining the values of the inner 
vectors are valid. Knowledge of the inner vectors permits this attack approach to be 
applied. Assuming the inner vectors are known, the attack proceeds as follows. 
1. We compiled a plaintext with seven 128-bit message blocks considering last 
blocks as the ICV, as shown in Table 3.12. 
2. Using EPBC mode with 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher, we ran the 
code to encrypt this plaintext and obtained the ciphertext shown in Table 
3.13.  
3. We constructed a forged message as described above. The fraudulent 
message is shown in Table 3.14 (three new consecutive ciphertext blocks 
have been inserted between the 4th and the 5th ciphertext blocks).   
4. When we decrypt the forged message, we obtain a new message with the 
same last message block as the original plaintext, as shown in Table 3.15.  
01010101010101010101010101010101 
000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51 
f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6 
9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d 
603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 
Table 3.12 Experimental plaintext message (EPBC-insertion part 2) 
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43c3033ca7bf6f0a851ed410baa82273 
9a0dd46bf2c07494a0fa9b27bb6f59ef 
6f7ff69f4c47bbb1fecdb0aef90cc322 
65e853974dfc9fff620865312eec755a 
f30d93f311add070815d1b6a9db95153 
327034f1b4528c933d55df6b4a66cab3 
8e55a18f38a42fdb46133ba5e55d3d88 
Table 3.13 Experimental ciphertext message (EPBC-insertion part 2) 
43c3033ca7bf6f0a851ed410baa82273 
9a0dd46bf2c07494a0fa9b27bb6f59ef 
6f7ff69f4c47bbb1fecdb0aef90cc322 
65e853974dfc9fff620865312eec755a 
ae3faad75c07ac99615ab0d3f85471ab 
a2752be12c128295d75deeddc757db83 
ec0e53d3df2e5be9c21c74610b555528 
f30d93f311add070815d1b6a9db95153 
327034f1b4528c933d55df6b4a66cab3 
8e55a18f38a42fdb46133ba5e55d3d88 
Table 3.14 The forged message (EPBC-insertion part 2) 
01010101010101010101010101010101 
000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51 
36a8199e5ffcb4f7ceb7d0c7c313a1ad 
c1ce77b23371fc648798dcc2a39d0c85 
62e0c76996b606f2b709a235fe279653 
f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6 
9cfc4e967edb808d679f777bc6702c7d 
603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d7781 
Table 3.15 Decrypted forged ciphertext (insertion part 2) 
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3.2.2.4 The chosen-plaintext forgery attack 
We described this generic attack against all three cross chaining AE modes (IOBC, 
EPBC and PCBC) in Sect. 3.1.  Now we investigate the precise probability of applying 
this attack to EPBC.   
Suppose the block length of underlying cipher is 128 bits. As discussed in Sect. 3.1.3, 
to find one common ciphertext block or two consecutive common ciphertext blocks 
corresponding to a single or two consecutive common plaintext blocks in a large 
number of messages has similar complexity. According to the Birthday Paradox 
theory, for the first case, we need 63.52  messages to compare the ciphertexts to find 
a single ciphertext block in common in two messages. Then, we need to run roughly
1262 comparisons to check every message to find the collision.  Therefore, the 
complexity of the chosen-plaintext forgery attack is 1262 . The success probability is 50% 
when the ciphertext condition is met. Regarding the second case, we need 642  
messages to compare the ciphertexts to find a single ciphertext block in common in 
two messages. Then, we need to run roughly 1272 comparisons to check every 
message to find the collision.  Therefore, the complexity of the chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack is 1272 . The success probability 1 2 n  when the ciphertext condition is 
met. 
Experimental validation 
We choose to find one identical pair of ciphertext blocks in two messages to 
demonstrate this forgery attack. As discussed in Sect. 3.1.3, again, this approach is 
based on Mitchell’s version of attack. The complexity of the attack is roughly the 
same; the construction of forgery is the same. The complete attack would be 
performed as follows: 
1. Create a generator to produce 642  random plaintext 1 4,...,P P , each block with 
the length of 128 bits.  
2. Set a fixed plaintext blocks: '1P , and let
*
,1 ,1n nP P ,
*
,2 ,2n nP P ,
* '
,3 1nP P  ,
*
,4 ,3n nP P and
*
,5 ,4n nP P .  
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3. Encrypt these plaintext messages with EPBC to yield corresponding ciphertext 
messages * *
,1 ,5,...,n nC C respectively.  
4. Find out ciphertext messages with * *
,3 ,3n mC C  in the 
642  ciphertexts.  
5. Construct a forged message *C = * * * *,1 ,2 ,3 ,5, , ,...,n n m mC C C C . 
6. Decrypt the forged message with EPBC checking whether * *
,5 ,5n mP P . 
However, the amount of calculation involved in both approaches is computationally 
intensive. Instead, we manually construct two messages in which a pair of 
plaintext/ciphertext blocks are the same to verify the feasibility of the forgery attack. 
More specifically:  
1. We compiled two plaintext messages with five 128-bit message blocks, as 
shown in Table 3.16. Note that the second block is the same in each of these 
messages. 
2. Using EPBC mode with 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher, we ran the 
EPBC algorithm to encrypt these plaintexts and obtained the ciphertexts as 
shown in Table 3.17.  
3. We constructed a forged message as described above. Note that, the two 
messages that we constructed only have one matching plaintext/ciphertext 
pair. As discussed in Sect. 3.1, it works the same, with similar success 
probability. The fraudulent message is shown in Table 3.18 (replace the first 
two ciphertext blocks of ciphertext 1 with the first two ciphertext blocks of 
ciphertext 2).   
4. We obtain a new message with the same last message block as the original 
plaintext 1 when we decrypt the forged message, as shown in Table 3.19.  
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Plaintext 1: 
43c3033ca7bf6f0a851ed410baa82273 
000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51 
f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6 
Plaintext 2: 
00000000000000000000000000000000 
000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f 
c05f9f9ca9834fa042ae8fba584b09ff 
dc7e84bfda79164b7ecd8486985d3860 
39ffed143b28b1c832113c6331e5407b 
Table 3.16 Experimental plaintext messages for chosen-plaintext attack (EPBC) 
Ciphertext 1: 
bdaa8337c8f1455fe04c736e6fe5877a 
9bd48acd53229ca81a8f98db858ed3be 
34b84c12a1b4f813daa142ac319498ad 
d5c5a78388e36bf3d6219689b9ade8c4 
f4d472a8a47d11a7ae59e17f300df33f 
Ciphertext 2: 
cfe613e2897bd383a50753e71c21ec2d 
9bd48acd53229ca81a8f98db858ed3be 
bb1805d0cb994020c612ba4e9aaea1da 
ef17bf73a34b181997fa77c22c139fb0 
13186d1144f6540981e1eaa8c46eb849 
Table 3.17 Experimental ciphertext messages for chosen-plaintext attack (EPBC) 
 
62 
 
cfe613e2897bd383a50753e71c21ec2d 
9bd48acd53229ca81a8f98db858ed3be 
34b84c12a1b4f813daa142ac319498ad 
d5c5a78388e36bf3d6219689b9ade8c4 
f4d472a8a47d11a7ae59e17f300df33f 
Table 3.18 The forged message for chosen-plaintext attack (EPBC) 
00000000000000000000000000000000 
000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f 
6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172a 
ae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e51 
f58c4c04d6e5f1ba779eabfb5f7bfbd6 
Table 3.19 Decrypted forged ciphertext for chosen-plaintext attack (EPBC) 
3.2.2.5 Comparison 
Suppose the block length of the underlying cipher is 128 bits and that this cipher 
uses a 128-bit key. Also, suppose the attacker knows a number of consecutive pairs 
of plaintext and ciphertext blocks. Table 3.20 (following) compares the results of the 
different attack approaches that we have considered. Note that Those attacks which 
did not give complexity figures in brackets can be perform straight away with certain 
success probabilities rather than going through comparisons to obtain certain 
conditional parameters first then computing success probabilities. 
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Forgery attack 
types 
Success rate 
(complexity) 
Assumption Comments 
Exhaustive key 
search on 'K and
K  
( 2562 ) The first three block 
pairs are available 
A forgery attack is guaranteed once 
'K and K are identified. 
Exhaustive key 
search on 'K   
1282  At least the first two 
block pairs are 
available 
With the knowledge of 'K , the initial 
vectors can be recovered and then a 
forgery attack is attainable. But the 
process of verifying 'K is infeasible.  
Exhaustive key 
search on K  
( 2312 ) Three consecutive 
block pairs are 
available 
A forgery is guaranteed once K is 
identified. 
Brute force ICV 2 l  The last l bits of 
plaintext is ICV 
If 128l  bits, then this approach has 
lower complexity than other attacks.  
Ciphertext block 
deletion 
1282  15 staggered block 
pairs are available 
As shown in Sect. 3.2 Mitchell’s 
claim is not correct. It is only a 
probabilistic attack. 
Ciphertext block 
insertion 
1282  15 staggered block 
pairs are available 
The more distinct blocks are 
inserted; the lower is the success 
probability of the attack. 
Chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack 1 
1281 2   
( 1272 ) 
two consecutive 
plaintext  blocks in 
two distinct messages 
are matching 
Regardless of the length of message 
and the feature of the function g . 
Chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack 2 
0.5 
( 1262 ) 
one plaintext block in 
two distinct messages 
are matching 
Regardless of the length of message 
and the feature of the function g . 
Table 3.20 The comparison of different attacks for EPBC 
Note that Mitchell’s forgery attack, our insertion attack, and exhaustive key search 
on 'K  have similar success probabilities, which are no better than choosing 
ciphertext randomly and hoping the correct ICV is returned by the decryption 
64 
 
operation. They are also similar in that when we generate a forgery, we do not know 
whether it is successful until the receiver accepts it. On the other hand, exhaustive 
key search on K or both 'K andK or chosen-plaintext forgery guarantee to give a 
successful forgery but the calculation complexity is prohibitive. 
3.2.3 Summary 
In this section, we have investigated Mitchell’s forgery attack on EPBC. This attack 
requires the knowledge of the inner vectors
iG . As discussed in Sect. 3.2.1, this inner 
vector can only be narrowed to two alternatives per bit pair, rather than one as 
claimed in Mitchell’s paper. Therefore, the value of 
iG cannot be revealed uniquely, 
even when the attacker knows very many pairs of plaintext and ciphertext blocks. 
However, we can lower the number of alternatives of the inner vectors. For the case 
where the block length of the underlying cipher is 128 bits, the number of 
alternatives is reduced from 1282 alternatives to 642 alternatives. The success rate of 
Mitchell’s forgery attack therefore is 1282 .  
 We further proposed an alternative approach to apply the forgery attack by 
inserting a single ciphertext block; this attack has the same probability of success as 
Mitchell’s attack, namely 1282 . Multiple ciphertext blocks also can be inserted, but 
the more blocks inserted; the lower the success probability of the attack.  
We investigated exhaustive key search for the two keys in EPBC and use the 
complexity of this for comparisons. Brute force of both 'K andK  guarantees a 
forgery attack with complexity 2562 . Brute force of 'K gives a probabilistic attack with 
success probability 1282 . Brute force ofK also guarantees a forgery attack but with 
roughly 2312 complexity. None of these attacks are useful or practical. The chosen-
plaintext forgery attack has a complexity of at least 1262 , which is, at best, only 
slightly better than a brute force attack on the ICV, which is also impractical. Then, 
we investigated brute force ICV. In comparison to other attacks, this attack only 
needs to randomly choose a forged ciphertext and hope that the last ciphertext 
block decrypts the correct ICV. This will occur with the probability of 2 l where l  is 
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the length of ICV. We recommended ICV length is at least 128-bit to provide better 
security.  
On the basis of above complexity, EPBC is in fact secure against forgery attack. It can 
successfully protect data integrity which is one of its major intended applications. 
Additionally, we recommend that the ICV should be no shorter than the block length, 
to reduce the success rate of brute force attacks on the ICV. 
3.3 Analysis of IOBC 
In 2013, Mitchell analysed IOBC and pointed out that it vulnerable to known-
plaintext forgery attack and proposed a forgery attack on the basis of this 
vulnerability. He claimed [25] that the permutation function in IOBC could yield the 
same value of input after a certain large amount of iterations, which permitted a 
forgery if a large amount of plaintext/ciphertext pairs were available. The success 
rate of applying a forgery attack to IOBC is around /32n , where n  is the block size of 
the underlying block cipher. In other words, it cannot guarantee the integrity 
security service to messages. It fails to achieve one of its major intended applications.   
In this section, firstly, we review Mitchell’s analysis and develop a theory for one of 
his arguments that was not previously provided, and validate his forgery attack by 
coding it into C programming language. Secondly, we propose alternative attacks to 
break the integrity mechanism of IOBC and compare the success rates of all attacks. 
Thirdly, we draw a conclusion for this section. 
3.3.1 Previous analysis 
Mitchell’s forgery attack [27] on IOBC aims to delete some portion of ciphertext 
blocks without being detected as a forgery by the integrity mechanism. The inner 
vectors, iF and iG , in IOBC ensure the integrity protection by propagating inaccurate 
decryptions from any tampered ciphertext blocks through to all subsequent blocks 
[5]. In order to mount that forgery, the forged ciphertext block after the deleted 
portion must have the capability to adjust values of the inner vectors during the 
decryption process, to permit correct decryption of the ICV, so that the integrity 
check will be successful.  
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Recacha [5] discussed a feature of IOBC that permits the attacker to calculate a value 
related to inner vectors 
iG output from the function g simply by using the 
knowledge of plaintext/ciphertext pairs. The function g in IOBC is critical in 
protecting the contents of the inner vectors from discovery. Mitchell [27] formalized 
the feature of IOBC discussed by Recacha and pointed out a serious vulnerability of 
the linear function g . This allows a forged ciphertext to be constructed to break the 
integrity mechanism of IOBC.  We explain the weakness features of IOBC and 
Mitchell’s forgery attack in this section. Note that, we are considering a cipher with 
64-bit blocks in this section. There are also some corresponding results for the block 
length of 128 bits. But, the experimental works for the block length of 128 bits is 
beyond our ability to conduct.   
3.3.1.1 Mitchell’s Lemma 
Argument 1 
Mitchell [27] formalized a structural feature of IOBC that was mentioned by Recacha, 
which potentially allows the attacker to forge a ciphertext message, and noted that 
this result can be proved by induction. We state the result and provide details of the 
proof in the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.7 [27]: 
Suppose 1 2, ,..., uC C C are the ciphetext blocks corresponding to the encryption of 
plaintext blocks 1 2, ,..., uP P P using IOBC, and iF and iG are the inner vectors. Then: 
   1 2 1 2 2k k i ki j i j i j j kg C P g G G        , 1 2j u   ,  1 / 2k u j   . 
Proof: 
Note first that  1 2 2j j j jC P g G G     , where1 2j u   (see fig. 2.12). Thus the 
result holds for 1k  . We now assume that the result is true for k and show that it 
then holds for k +1.  
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 1 11 2 1 2k k ii j i j ig C P       =     1 2 1 2 2( 1) 1 2( 1)k k ii j i j i j k j kg g C P C P             
                                                  2 2( 1) 1 2( 1)k j j k j k j kg g G G C P          
                                                   1 2 2( 1) 1 2( 1)k j j k j k j kg G g G C P           
                                                   1 2 2( 1) 1 1 2( 1)k j j k j k j kg G g G g G G            
                                               1 2( 1)k j j kg G G    . 
From this, the result follows by induction, as Mitchell claimed. □ 
Using this result, a forgery attack could be introduced if  k j jg G G for some k . In 
this case, if the forged cryptogram:  1 2 1 2, ,... , ( ) , ,...ks s t s s t s t uC C C C g g G G C C     
(where 0 s u  , 2 t u  and s t u  ) is decrypted by IOBC, then the series of 
plaintext blocks will be equal to: 1 2 1 2, ,... , , ,...s s t s s t s t uP P P P F F P P      .  In such a 
case, the final block of the forged ciphertext messages will decrypt to the correct ICV, 
so that the recipient will believe the forged messages is authentic.    
Rechacha [5] claimed the probability to get  k j jg G G is ( /2 1)2 n  . Mitchell [27] later 
pointed out the accurate probability is around /32 n . Rechacha’s assumption was 
derived from the properties of the left part of sub-rotation in the function g . Recall 
that the left part of sub-rotation has the length of / 2 1n  .  However, he overlooked 
the fact that the lengths of two bit sub-rotations happening in the function g are 
multiple of 3, which can significantly lower the probability. 
Argument 2   
Mitchell [27] noted that if X is an arbitrary chosen 64-bit block then: 
  341 222Pr X g X   .  According to the definition of the function g , L RX X X . 
Let LX denote the leftmost 31 bits of X , and RX denote the rightmost 33 bits of X  . 
For certain form of RX ,   341 222Pr X g X   . When X is processed 341 times by 
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the function g , LX will remain the same value, simply because 341=31×11; RX will 
execute a rightwards (circle) shift by 11-bit positions after the whole
RX  circulates 
10 times, for 341=33×10+11. If
RX is with a structure of Z Z Z , where Z is a 
random 11-bit string, 
RX will remain unchanged as well. The probability to have an 
RX equals to Z Z Z is
11 332 / 2 , namely 222 .  
Argument 3       
Mitchell [27] also shows the probability to find some k that gives  k j jg G G  for n
=128 case. If X is an arbitrary chosen 128-bit block, we have   1365 422Pr X g X   . 
Similarly, let L RX X X , where LX denotes the leftmost 63 bits of X , and RX
denotes the rightmost 65 bits of X . When X is processed 1365 times by the function
g , RX will keep unchanged, for 1365=65×21; LX will run a rightwards (circle) shift 
by 42-bit positions after the whole LX circulates by 21 times, for 1365=63×21+42. If
LX  is with a structure of Z Z Z , where Z is a random 21-bit string, LX will remain 
unchanged as well. The probability to have an LX equals to Z Z Z is
21 632 / 2 , 
namely 422 . 
3.3.2 Mitchell’s Attack 
Known-Plaintext Forgery Attack 
We suppose the length of underlying block cipher for IOBC is 64 bits, such as DES, 
which uses a 56-bit key. We also suppose the attacker knows ciphertext blocks
1 2, ,..., uC C C  and the corresponding plaintext blocks 1 2, ,..., uP P P  where 685u  .  
Applying Mitchell’s Argument 1 with 1j  and 341k  , the attacker can compute
 341 1 683g G G  from the knowledge of 2 4 682, ,...,C C C and 3 5 683, ,...,P P P . Mitchell 
explained [27] that the new ciphertext message * * *
1 2 682, ,..., uC C C  is equal to: 
   3421 684 1 683 685, , ,..., uC C g G g G C C  . 
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Note that, provided that messages are long enough, this approach will clearly work 
for deletion of blocks after
2C . 
We now compute the internal values of *
2C , we have: 
                                                * *2 2 1F C g G   
                                                          342684 1 683 1C g G g G g G     
                                                         341684 1 683 1C g g G G g G     
                                                      (From Argument 2, Pr = 222 ) 
                                                           684 1 683 1C g G g G g G      
                                                       684 683C g G   
                                                      684F . 
 
Then we have: 
 * *2 2KG d F  
         684Kd F  
684G . 
684F and 684G are inner vectors for 684C . When they propagate to 
*
3C ( 685C ), 
*
3C will 
produce correct inner vectors 685F and 685G , and likewise the following ciphertext 
blocks will generate its corresponding inner vectors. At last, the final ciphertext block
*
682uC   will decrypt to give the correct ICV, as shown in Fig. 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7 IOBC decryption of forged ciphertext message 
The success rate of the above attack is 222  . Note that this known-plaintext forgery 
attack is applicable for deletion of any consecutive 682 ciphertext blocks from an 
authentic message, given that the first block and final two blocks are left untouched. 
Mitchell argued [27] that an attacker at least needs to know 681 plaintext blocks of a 
message to yield one forgery. He may need to produce up to 222  forgeries, so that at 
least one of them will be accepted by the receiver.  
 Experimental Validation 
We performed step 1 to 5 for 710  times. Given the success probability of this attack 
is 222 , we would expect roughly 2.5 pairs of messages with the last message block 
matching in the C programming code we compiled.  The process we used to conduct 
this forgery is presented blow. One of the two successful forgeries we obtained is 
shown in Table 3.24. 
1. We created a generator to produce 685 random plaintext blocks, each block 
with a length of 64 bits as shown in Table 3.21 (we only show the first and the 
last two blocks in here, for the rest of blocks will be cut off later).  
2. We encrypted this plaintext message with IOBC to yield corresponding 
ciphertext blocks as shown in Table 3.22.  
3. We used the knowledge of 2 4 682, ,...,C C C and 3 5 683, ,...,P P P to compute
 341 1 683g G G , and let  
341
1 683g G G be processed by the function g and 
XORed with 684C .  
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4. We set  342684 1 683( )C g G g G  as
*
2C , 1C as
*
1C and 685C as
*
3C to construct a 
forged ciphertext as shown in Table 3.23.   
5. We decrypted the forged message and checked to see if the last message 
block is the same as the original plaintext, as shown in Table 3.24.  
Plaintext: 
06841e4449c02d86 
. 
. 
. 
3c77759754036ac8 
620e146c13f773d5 
Table 3.21 Experimental plaintext messages (IOBC deletion) 
Ciphertext: 
2f2a024410bbedad 
. 
. 
. 
b56ee5e11542feae 
c95dbc4df14dcbfa 
Table 3.22 Experimental ciphertext message (IOBC deletion) 
2f2a024410bbedad 
3a0559880aaa39fc 
c95dbc4df14dcbfa 
Table 3.23 The forged message (IOBC deletion) 
06841e4449c02d86 
727870d82e822d7b 
620e146c13f773d5 
Table 3.24 Decrypted forged ciphertext (IOBC deletion) 
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3.3.3  Mitchell’s Analysis 
The above attack also works in a similar fashion for the n =128 case, which requires 
deletion of 2730 consecutive ciphertext blocks from a legitimate message and 
modification of the ciphertext block following the deleted portion [27]. Based on 
Argument 3, the probability that the decrypting party accepts the forgery is 422 .  
Recacha [5] claimed that the probability an adversary can succeed with a forgery 
attack is /22 n . But Mitchell [27] pointed out that with any value of n , the known-
plaintext forgery attack can succeed with probability of approximately /32 n . Recall 
that Mitchell’s attack requires 681 blocks known plaintext. Mitchell further explained 
that limiting the maximum length of any message encrypted using IOBC can protect 
it from the known-plaintext forgery attack. However, unless the length of message is 
really small, a less effective forgery can still be appied. For instance, for the n =64 
case, we can let X be processed 93 times by the function g . Then, LX will remain 
unchanged, since 93=31×3; RX will execute a rightwards (circle) shift by 27-bit 
positions after the whole RX  circulates by twice, for 341=33×2+27. If RX is 
constructed by 11 Z s concatenating, where Z is a random 3-bit string, RX will 
remain unchanged as well. The probability to have an RX with that structure is
3 332 / 2 , namely 302 . Thus only 189 blocks of ciphertext and corresponding plaintext 
need to be known for a forgery attack with the success probability of 302  [27]. 
3.3.4 Other attacks 
In this section, we first investigate exhaustive key search to break the integrity 
mechanism of IOBC. Recall that IOBC uses two keys, 'K andK . In the following we 
suppose that DES is used, so the block length of the underlying cipher is 64 bits, note 
also that this cipher uses 56-bit keys. We consider exhaustive search on both keys. 
Secondly, we investigate brute force attack on the ICV. Thirdly, we propose an 
alternative approach to launch a forgery attack based on the vulnerability of the 
function g . It is still only a probabilistic attack, with the same probability of success 
as Mitchell’s forgery attack.  
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3.3.4.1 Exhaustive key search 
IOBC uses two secret keys. Key 'K is used to firstly encrypt a sequence number S to 
obtain
0F , and then encrypt 0F  to obtain 0G . Key K  is used to encrypt iG  to obtain
iF  for each message block. In the following analysis, we first consider exhaustive key 
search of both keys, and then consider possible attacks involving each key separately. 
Suppose S is known to the public and a number of pairs of plaintext/ciphertext 
blocks are known to the attacker.  
Exhaustive key attack on both 'K and K  
The approach to exhaustive key attack on both 'K andK on IOBC is similar to EPBC in 
previous section. Since the length of key is 56 bits, the complexity of exhaustively 
guessing both keys is 1122 . 
Exhaustive key attack on 'K  
The approach to exhaustive key attack on 'K  on IOBC is also similar to EPBC in Sect. 
3.2.2.1. To apply exhaustive key search to recover key 'K , the probability is 562 .  
Exhaustive key attack on K  
Assume the attacker knows three consecutive plaintext/ciphertext pairs. There are
642 possible values for a 64-bit block. If the attacker guesses keyK , he can pick a 
value for 
iF  from those
642 alternatives and decrypt
iF with key K to obtain iG , then 
compute 
1iF  ( 1 1 ( )i i iF C g G   ) and encrypt 1iF  to gain 1iG  , and then compare the 
value of
1iG   to 
'
1 1i i iG P F   . On average, the attacker will find
642 keys for which at 
least one 
1iG  and
'
1iG   are matching. After that, the attacker performs another loop 
to compare the values of 2iG  and
'
2iG  to find out which match is correct. The chance 
he gets any false key giving a correct match is negligible at this step. Thereafter, the 
forgery attack discussed in Sect. 3.2.1.3 is possible to apply on IOBC as well.  
To work out the keyK , the attacker needs a ciphertext block (
iC ) to know the 
alternatives for
iF . Then he can use the next known block pairs ( 1iP and 1iC  ) to find a 
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matching pair inner vectors (
1iG  and
'
1iG  ) and the third known block pairs ( 2iP and
2iC  ) to check the whether the correspondent inner vectors are matching ( 2iG  and
'
2iG  ).The attacker need to examine 
642  values of 
iF to all
562  possible keys to find 
642 combinations and then perform another 642 comparisons to find the correct key. 
Hence, with the knowledge of three plaintext/ciphertext pairs, the complexity of 
working out the key K is roughly 64 56 64 1212 2 2 2 2    encryption/decryption 
operations. The knowledge of key K and inner vectors guarantees the attacker to 
mount a successful forgery attack. 
3.3.4.2 Brute force of ICV 
The approach to brute force of ICV on IOBC is similar to EPBC. Assume the last l  bits 
of the ciphertext are the encrypted ICV. The probability of brute force ICV is 2 l . 
3.3.4.3 Forgery Attack- Insertion 
Rather than deletion, it is also possible to construct a forgery by insertion with 
similar probability of success. The attack is based on the weakness of IOBC 
mentioned in Sect. 3.3.1.  
Assume the block length of underlying cipher is 64 bits. Assume also the attacker 
knows ciphertext blocks 1 2, ,..., uC C C  and the corresponding plaintext blocks
1 2, ,..., uP P P  where 685u  . Applying Mitchell’s Argument 1 with 1j  and 341k  , 
the attacker can compute  341 1 683g G G  from the knowledge of 2 4 682, ,...,C C C and
3 5 683, ,...,P P P . The attacker can construct a new ciphertext message
* * *
1 2 682, ,..., uC C C  , 
which is equal to: 
   3421 683 683 1 1 2 3,..., , , ,. ,..., uC C g G C g G C C C  . 
We now compute the inner vectors of *
2C , we have: 
                                                * *684 684 683F C g G   
                                                            342683 1 1 683g G C g G g G     
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                                                         3411 1C g g G   
                                                         (From Argument 2, 222Pr  ) 
                                                         1 1C g G   
                                                        
1F . 
Then we have: 
 * *684 684KG d F  
       1Kd F  
                                                                       
1G , 
where
1F and 1G are inner vectors for 1C . When they propagate to 
*
685C ( 2C ), 
*
685C will 
produce correct inner vectors 
2F and 2G , and likewise the following ciphertext blocks 
will generate its corresponding inner vectors. At last, the final ciphertext block *
682uC   
will decrypt to the correct ICV as shown in Fig. 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8 IOBC decryption of inserted ciphertext message 
The success rate of the above attack is 222 .  This known-plaintext forgery attack 
allows an attacker to insert any consecutive 682 ciphertext blocks from an authentic 
message given that the first block and final block are not modified. The integrity 
mechanism of IOBC is defeated.  
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Experimental Validation 
We performed step 1 to 5 for 710  times.  Given the success probability of this attack 
is 222 , we would expect roughly 2.5 pairs of messages with the last message block 
matching in the C programming code we compiled.  The process we used to conduct 
this forgery is presented blow. One of the two success forgeries we obtained is 
shown in Table 3.28. 
1. We created a generator to produce 685 random plaintext blocks, each block 
with the length of 64 bits as shown in Table 3.25 (we only show the first two 
blocks and last three blocks in here, because these blocks can show the 
difference between original message and our forged message through 
comparison).  
2. We encrypted this plaintext message with IOBC to yield corresponding 
ciphertext blocks as shown in Table 3.26.  
3. We used the knowledge of
2 4 682, ,...,C C C and 3 5 683, ,...,P P P to compute
 341 1 683g G G , and let  
341
1 683g G G be processed by the function g and 
XOR with 1C .  
4. We set  3421 1 683( )C g G g G  as
*
684C , and inserted 2 685,...,C C after
*
684C  to 
construct the forged ciphertext as shown in Table 3.27.    
5. We decrypted the forged message and checked whether the last block of 
recovered message matches the last block of original message, as shown in 
Table 3.28. 
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Plaintext: 
34fb35b624b05b6e 
66a047762ba50137 
. 
. 
. 
45ca5faa6031115a 
4e122e0477ce19bd 
417c3f4b4da91664 
Table 3.25 Experimental plaintext messages (IOBC insertion) 
Ciphertext: 
6ebaddf0b18ea4ba 
9147515420839e4f 
. 
. 
. 
f0d16f107d02e8e2 
f1e6ae343d35bb33 
e61ef352ac5e7563 
Table 3.26 Experimental ciphertext messages (IOBC insertion) 
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6ebaddf0b18ea4ba 
9147515420839e4f 
. 
. 
. 
f0d16f107d02e8e2 
a72a206b04a58c5c 
9147515420839e4f 
. 
. 
. 
f0d16f107d02e8e2 
f1e6ae343d35bb33 
e61ef352ac5e7563 
Table 3.27 The forged message (IOBC insertion) 
34fb35b624b05b6e 
66a047762ba50137 
. 
. 
. 
45ca5faa6031115a 
1eee2f3b0075b744 
66a047762ba50137 
. 
. 
. 
45ca5faa6031115a 
4e122e0477ce19bd 
417c3f4b4da91664 
Table 3.28 Decrypted forged ciphertext (IOBC insertion) 
3.3.4.4 The Chosen-Plaintext Forgery Attack 
Suppose the block length of underlying cipher is 64 bits. As discussed in Sect. 3.1.3, 
to find one common ciphertext block or two consecutive common ciphertext blocks 
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corresponding to a single or two consecutive common plaintext blocks in a large 
number of messages has similar complexity. According to the Birthday Paradox 
theory, for the first case, we need 31.52  messages to compare the ciphertexts to find 
a single ciphertext block in common in two messages. Then, we need to run roughly
622 comparisons to check every message to find the collision.  Therefore, the 
complexity of this version of the chosen-plaintext forgery attack is 622 . The success 
probability is 50% when the ciphertext condition is met. Regarding of the second 
case, we need approximately 322  messages to compare the ciphertexts to find a 
single ciphertext block in common in two messages. Then, we need to run roughly
632 comparisons to check every message to find the collision.  Therefore, the 
complexity of this version of the chosen-plaintext forgery attack is 632 . The success 
probability is 641 2  when the ciphertext condition is met. 
Experimental validation 
Note that the amount of calculation involved in both approaches is computational 
intensive. We choose to find two consecutive identical pair of ciphertext blocks in 
two messages to verify the feasibility of the forgery attack. The complete attack 
would be performed as follows: 
1. We compiled two plaintext messages with five 64-bit message blocks, as 
shown in Table 3.29. Note that the second and third blocks are the same in 
both messages. 
2. Using IOBC mode with 64-bit DES as the underlying block cipher, we ran the 
code to encrypt these plaintexts and obtained the ciphertexts as shown in 
Table 3.30.  
3. We constructed a forged message as described in Sect. 3.1.1. The fraudulent 
message is shown in Table 3.31 (replace the 1st ciphertext block of ciphertext 
2 with the 1st ciphertext block of ciphertext 1).  
4. When we decrypt the forged message, we obtain the message with the same 
last message block as the original plaintext 2 as shown in Table 3.32.  
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Plaintext 1: 
64d859d69ca675dc 
b65542cc1671c12d 
deb3c1b4cc2ae9e8 
809f2c3d918f4955 
bdfde5cd6e2e1d0c 
 
Plaintext 2: 
8f6b9939eef5ba6f 
b65542cc1671c12d 
deb3c1b4cc2ae9e8 
490c37a29f71aba1 
054a7ecf21089296 
Table 3.29 Experimental plaintext messages for chosen-plaintext attack (IOBC) 
Ciphertext 1: 
7d14938d60ab9b53 
fcd4a94426fd8228 
b34f7b7fd70492d6 
89b06e556b311189 
f1426d5ea42db416 
 
Ciphertext 2: 
cbba24e2cc71c6ba 
fcd4a94426fd8228 
b34f7b7fd70492d6 
648197c485ce7d7c 
be9aa3399f791067 
Table 3.30 Experimental ciphertext messages for chosen-plaintext attack (IOBC) 
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7d14938d60ab9b53 
fcd4a94426fd8228 
b34f7b7fd70492d6 
648197c485ce7d7c 
be9aa3399f791067 
Table 3.31 The forged message for chosen-plaintext attack (IOBC) 
64d859d69ca675dc 
b65542cc1671c12d 
deb3c1b4cc2ae9e8 
490c37a29f71aba1 
054a7ecf21089296 
Table 3.32 Decrypted forged ciphertext for chosen-plaintext attack (IOBC) 
3.3.5 Comparison 
Mitchell investigated forgeries on IOBC for the case with block length of 64 bits and 
the case with the block length of 128 bits. We did some experimental works to verify 
their efficiency for the first case. The experimental validation for the second case is 
beyond our ability to conduct. As the experiment result reported for the first case in 
Sect. 3.4.4.4, we require so many plaintext blocks that we do not have space for 
storage in a single PC. In this section, we compare the success rate (and complexity) 
of different attacks based on assuming that the block length of the underlying cipher 
is 64 bits. Suppose the attacker knows a large number of consecutive pairs of 
plaintext and ciphertext blocks. Table 3.33 (following) compares the results of the 
different attack approaches that we have considered. Note that Those attacks which 
did not give complexity figures in brackets can be perform straight away with certain 
success probabilities rather than going through comparisons to obtain certain 
conditional parameters first then computing success probabilities. 
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Forgery attack types Success rate 
(complexity) 
Assumption Comments 
Exhaustive key search 
on 'K and K  
( 1122 ) The first three block pairs 
are available 
A forgery attack is 
guaranteed once 'K and K
are identified. 
Exhaustive key search 
on 'K   
562  At least the first two 
block pairs are available 
With the knowledge of 'K , 
the initial vectors can be 
recovered and then a forgery 
attack is attainable. But the 
process of verifying 'K is 
infeasible.  
Exhaustive key search 
on K  
( 1212 ) Three consecutive block 
pairs are available 
A forgery is guaranteed once
K is identified. 
Brute force ICV 2 l  The last l bits of plaintext 
is ICV 
In order to provide better 
integrity, the length of ICV 
should not be less than 64-
bit. 
Ciphertext block 
deletion 
222  685 consecutive block 
pairs are known 
The more forgeries need to 
construct, the longer known 
plaintexts is required. 
Ciphertext block 
insertion 
222  685 consecutive block 
pairs are known 
The more forgeries need to 
construct, the longer known 
plaintexts is required. 
Chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack 1 
641 2   
( 632 ) 
two consecutive 
plaintext blocks in two 
distinct messages are 
matching 
Regardless of the length of 
message and the feature of 
the function g . 
Chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack 2 
0.5 
( 622 ) 
a single plaintext block in 
two distinct messages 
are matching 
Regardless of the length of 
message and the feature of 
the function g . 
Table 3.33 The comparison of different attacks for IOBC (64-bit) 
Note that Mitchell’s forgery attack and our insertion attack have the same success 
probabilities, which are better than exhaustive key search on 'K or choosing 
ciphertext randomly and hoping the correct ICV is returned by the decryption 
operation. These four attacks are similar in that when we generate a forgery, we do 
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not know whether it is successful until the receiver accepts it. On the other hand, 
exhaustive key search on K or both 'K andK or chosen-plaintext forgery guarantee 
to give a successful forgery but the calculation complexity is prohibitive. 
 
Since we use the block length of 128-bit for EPBC and M-PCBC in this thesis, for 
consistency purpose, we also provide the theoretical success rate (complexity) to the 
block length of 128-bit below. Note that Those attacks which did not give complexity 
figures in brackets can be perform straight away with certain success probabilities 
rather than going through comparisons to obtain certain conditional parameters first 
then computing success probabilities. 
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Forgery attack types Success rate 
(complexity) 
Assumption Comments 
Exhaustive key search 
on 'K and K  
( 2562 ) The first three block pairs 
are available 
A forgery attack is 
guaranteed once 'K and K
are identified. 
Exhaustive key search 
on 'K   
1282  At least the first two block 
pairs are available 
With the knowledge of 'K , 
the initial vectors can be 
recovered and then a 
forgery attack is attainable. 
But the process of verifying
'K is infeasible.  
Exhaustive key search 
on K  
( 2572 ) Three consecutive block 
pairs are available 
A forgery is guaranteed 
once K is identified. 
Brute force ICV 2 l  The last l bits of plaintext is 
ICV 
In order to provide better 
integrity, the length of ICV 
should not be less than 
128-bit. 
Ciphertext block 
deletion 
422  2730 consecutive block 
pairs are known 
The more forgeries need to 
construct, the longer 
known plaintexts is 
required. 
Ciphertext block 
insertion 
422  2730 consecutive block 
pairs are known 
The more forgeries need to 
construct, the longer 
known plaintexts is 
required. 
Chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack 1 
1281 2   
( 1272 ) 
two consecutive plaintext 
blocks in two distinct 
messages are matching 
Regardless of the length of 
message and the feature of 
the function g . 
Chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack 2 
0.5  
( 1262 ) 
a single plaintext block in 
two distinct messages are 
matching 
Regardless of the length of 
message and the feature of 
the function g . 
Table 3.34 The comparison of different attacks for IOBC (128-bit) 
3.3.6 Summary 
In this section, we have implemented Mitchell’s analysis against IOBC authenticated 
encryption mode. Mitchell observed that the length of one of the sub-rotations are 
rotated by the function g is a multiple of 3. This feature increases the success rate of 
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a known-plaintext forgery attack from /22 n which is claimed by the IOBC author 
Recacha to /32 n . For a case where the block length of the underlying cipher is 64 bits; 
the success rate of Mitchell’s forgery attack, deleting 682 consecutive blocks, is 222 . 
We further propose an alternative approach to apply the forgery attack by inserting 
682 consecutive ciphertext blocks. This attack has the same probability of success as 
Mitchell’s attack, namely 222 . For a case where the block length of the underlying 
cipher is 128 bits; the success rate of Mitchell’s forgery attack, deleting 2730 
consecutive blocks, is 422 . The success rate of inserting 2730 consecutive ciphertext 
blocks is 422 . 
Mitchell also described a chosen-plaintext attack which does not require any 
conditions on the length of known plaintext messages or the properties of the 
function g  . We show that it also guarantees a forgery with a complexity of at least 
622 when the block length of underlying cipher is 64 bits. When the block length of 
underlying cipher is 128 bits, the complexity is at least 1262 . The chosen-plaintext 
attack on IOBC is, at best, only slightly better than a brute force attack on the ICV, 
which is impractical. 
We investigated exhaustive key search for the two keys in IOBC and use the 
complexity of this for comparisons. For a case where the block length of the 
underlying cipher is 64 bits, brute force of both 'K andK  guarantees a forgery 
attack with complexity 1122 . Brute force of 'K gives a probabilistic attack with success 
probability 562 . Brute force ofK also guarantees a forgery attack but with roughly
1212  complexity. None of these attacks are useful or practical. For a case where the 
block length of the underlying cipher is 128 bits, brute force of both 'K andK
guarantees a forgery attack with complexity 2562 . Brute force of 'K gives a 
probabilistic attack with success probability 1282 . Brute force ofK also guarantees a 
forgery attack but with roughly 2572  complexity. Then, we investigated brute force 
attacks on the ICV. In comparison to other attacks, this attack only needs to 
randomly choose a forged ciphertext and hope that the last ciphertext block 
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decrypts the correct ICV. This will occur with the probability of 2 l where l  is the 
length of ICV.  
Our experimental verification supports Mitchell’s suggestion that IOBC fails to 
guarantee the assurance of integrity services to messages, which is one of its major 
intended applications.  
3.4 Analysis of M-PCBC 
Recently, Mitchell analysed M-PCBC, pointing out that its weakness in integrity 
protection allows a ciphertext only forgery attack [29]. In this section, firstly, we 
review Mitchell’s analysis and validate his forgery attack by coding it into C 
programming language. Secondly, we propose alternative attacks to break the 
integrity mechanism of M-PCBC and compare the success rates of all attacks. One of 
the attacks we proposed guarantees a successful forgery. Thirdly, we draw a 
conclusion for this section. 
3.4.1 Forgery attack-modification 
Mitchell [29] analysed M-PCBC and pointed out that it is vulnerable to a ciphertext 
only forgery attack. This vulnerability allows the attacker to swap two ciphertext 
blocks but the decryption of the final block will still remain unchanged. Thus the 
protection of data integrity failed.  
For example, suppose we interchange the i -th and 2i  -th ciphertext blocks in a 
cryptogram where 4i u  and consider the decryption of the i -th to 4i  -th blocks. 
Let 1 4, ,...,i i iC C C  denote the original ciphertext blocks and 1 4, ,...,i i iP P P   denote the 
corresponding plaintext; also let * 2i iC C   and
*
2i iC C  be the altered ciphertext 
blocks and * * *1 4, ,...,i i iP P P  be the decryption of the altered ciphertext. Decrypting 
* * *
1 4, ,...,i i iC C C  using M-PCBC gives: 
 * 2 1i K i i iP d C M P     
   * *1 1 2 2L R L Ri K i i i i i iP d C M M C C P         
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   * *2 2 2 1 1 1L R L R L Ri K i i i i i i i iP d C M M C C C C P             
   * *3 3 2 2 1 1 2L R L R L R L Ri K i i i i i i i i i iP d C M M C C C C C C P                
   * *4 4 2 2 1 1 3 3 3L R L R L R L R L Ri K i i i i i i i i i i i iP d C M M C C C C C C C C P                  
           4 31 2 2i iL R L R L Ri i K i i i i i i ii iM P d C C C C C C C
 
            
        
4iP  
as required. The first four plaintext blocks will decrypt incorrectly, but the fifth block 
will not suffer from any alteration. It is obvious that the plaintext of M-PCBC is a 
function of ciphertext blocks, IVs and the key, but the sequence of ciphertext can be 
altered without affecting the ICV. The interchanging can occur in any even or odd 
position prior to the final block. For instance, if the second and fourth blocks are also 
swapped in the above example, the first four blocks will be corrupted, but the fifth 
block will not be affected. It is also worth mentioning that if two consecutive 
ciphertext blocks are swapped, the following blocks will all be corrupted.   
Experimental validation 
We demonstrated the above forgery attack for a specific example. 
1. We compiled a plaintext with five message blocks, each block with 128-bit as 
shown in Table 3.35.  
2. We ran M-PCBC code to encrypt this plaintext to corresponding ciphertext as 
shown in Table 3.36.  
3. We swapped the first block with third block, and the second block with the 
fourth block to construct a forged message as shown in Table 3.37.   
4. When we decrypt the fraudulent message, we obtain a new message with 
the same last message block as the original plaintext, as shown in Table 3.38.  
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43c3033ca7bf6f0a851ed410baa82273 
58ced1d522fb163cb319dd839977184b 
234da902a9c1cb1c43a04555c2d1fce9 
e36f8cb9397324e3e7ed02618fb2fcc1 
3cd7f79537705b964ef9c53e728fbd88 
Table 3.35 Authentic plaintext message (M-PCBC) 
 
64d859d69ca675dcb65542cc1671c12d 
deb3c1b4cc2ae9e8809f2c3d918f4955 
bdfde5cd6e2e1d0c5dec5ca242214658 
c4f02ddebda262d8e076748d8234f924 
0549b50108bd030b0afaa7a6ef808b28 
Table 3.36 Authentic ciphertext message (M-PCBC) 
bdfde5cd6e2e1d0c5dec5ca242214658 
c4f02ddebda262d8e076748d8234f924 
64d859d69ca675dcb65542cc1671c12d 
deb3c1b4cc2ae9e8809f2c3d918f4955 
0549b50108bd030b0afaa7a6ef808b28 
Table 3.37 Forged ciphertext message for modification (M-PCBC) 
a90e63cd01ed69d1ae95755f0603441f 
e58db0e5462d92620ad8326b4b604437 
465f0ab6cd9da63cab40bf28ce5efdb8 
99c538635b401fa29d47b6bbed81c780 
3cd7f79537705b964ef9c53e728fbd88 
Table 3.38 Decrypted plaintext of forged message for modification (M-PCBC) 
3.4.2 Other attacks 
In this section, we first investigate exhaustive key search to break the integrity 
mechanism of M-PCBC. In the following we suppose that the block length of the 
underlying cipher is 128 bits and that this cipher uses 128-bit keys. Second, we 
investigate brute force attack on ICV. Third, we propose an alternative approach to 
launch a forgery attack.  
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3.4.2.1 Exhaustive key search 
There are a few different ways that exhaustive key search can be done. The simplest 
approach is a ciphertext only attack where we guess the key and decrypt the 
ciphertext to see whether it gives recognisable plaintext. Depending on the message 
format, this may require decryption of several blocks of ciphertext for each key. 
Another approach is to assume the first three plaintext/ciphertext pairs are known. If 
the attacker guesses a value for key K from 1282 possible values, he can decrypt the 
ciphertext and check whether the three known successive plaintext blocks match 
with the corresponding recovered three plaintext blocks to find the correct K . On 
average, the attacker will find at least 1282 K getting a match for the first 
plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Checking the next two decryptions should guarantee that 
only the correctK will remain.  
In both approaches, exhaustively guessing K requires 1282  guesses. Checking each of 
these guesses will require at least one decryption, so the complexity will be around
1282 . Knowing K allows the attacker to decrypt all ciphertext messages and 
impersonate either sender or receiver to communicate with the other one.   
3.4.2.2 Brute force of ICV 
The approach to brute force of ICV on M-PCBC is similar to EPBC. Assume the last l
bits of the ciphertext are the encrypted ICV. The probability of brute force ICV is 2 l . 
3.4.2.3 Forgery attack-deletion  
Sierra et al [8] did not clearly discuss the feature of the two IVs. It is clear that IVs 
should be distinct for each plaintext message. The ICV should be chosen randomly or 
created by a counter, and then either only known by both parties or sent with the 
encrypted message by the sender [29]. We assume the message originator sends 
two IVs with the encrypted message. If the two IVs are generated by a counter, the 
attacker is required to predict the counter and intercept at the right time, which is 
hard to achieve. Hence, we also assume the two IVs are created randomly. In such a 
case the receiver will accept any IVs forged by the adversary.  
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We now suppose that the attacker knows a ciphertext message [ 1 2,IV IV ]
1 2, ,..., uC C C and  the corresponding first three plaintext blocks 1 2 3, ,P P P . Given the 
definition of the function g  in Sect. 2.3.2.2, obtaining the knowledge of 
1IV , 2IV and 
1 2 3, ,C C C allows the attacker to compute  K id C ( 1 3i  ) and memory 
2 3 4, ,M M M . Then the attacker can delete either the first two ciphertext blocks 
1 2,C C or the second and third ciphertext blocks 2 3,C C without corrupting the fourth 
and following blocks. In the first case, the attacker simply changes the value of 
2IV to 
3M  to keep 4M unchanged and alters the value of 1IV  to 2P  ( 3P is not affected). In 
terms of the second case, the attacker requires to manipulate the value of 2IV to 
keep 4M unchanged (  2 1 4,g IV C M ) and the value of 1IV to let 1C decrypt to 3P
(  1 1 3Kd C IV P  ). The more plaintext blocks that are known by the attacker, the 
more memories can by computed, so that the more ciphertext blocks can be deleted.  
Experiment validation 
We simulated the above forgery attack for a specific example. Note that knowledge 
of the inner vectors permits this attack approach to be applied. Assuming the inner 
vectors are known, the attack proceeds as follows. 
1. We used the same plaintext messages and ciphertext adopted in Sect. 3.4.1 
to run the experiment here (see Table 3.35 and 3.36). 
2. We applied the first forgery case discussed above. To construct the forged 
message (Table 3.39), we need to delete the first two ciphertext blocks, set 
1IV as 2P  and 2IV as 3M .  
3. The result of M-PCBC decrypting has the same last three plaintext block as 
the authentic messages, as shown in Table 3.40. 
bdfde5cd6e2e1d0c5dec5ca242214658 
c4f02ddebda262d8e076748d8234f924 
0549b50108bd030b0afaa7a6ef808b28 
Table 3.39 Forged ciphertext for deletion (M-PCBC) 
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234da902a9c1cb1c43a04555c2d1fce9 
e36f8cb9397324e3e7ed02618fb2fcc1 
3cd7f79537705b964ef9c53e728fbd88 
Table 3.40 Decrypted plaintext of forged ciphertext for deletion (M-PCBC) 
3.4.2.4 The chosen-plaintext forgery attack 
Suppose the block length of underlying cipher is 128 bits. As discussed in Sect. 3.1.3, 
assume two plaintext messages P  and 'P  are constructed with '1 1i jP P  and
'
i jP P . 
According to the Birthday Paradox theory, we need 642  messages to compare the 
ciphertexts to find a pair of messages with 'i jC C . Then, we need to run roughly
1272
comparisons to check every message to find the collision.  Therefore, the complexity 
of the chosen-plaintext forgery attack is 1272 . A forgery is guaranteed when the 
ciphertext condition is met.  
The alternative attack assume that two plaintext messages P  and 'P  are 
constructed with 'i jP P . According to the Birthday Paradox theory, we need 
642  
messages to compare the ciphertexts to find a pair of messages with 'i jC C . Then, 
we need to run roughly 1272 comparisons to check every message to find the collision.  
Therefore, the complexity of the chosen-plaintext forgery attack is 1272 . There is a 
very low chance ( 642 ) to run a successful forgery when the ciphertext condition is 
met. 
Experimental validation 
We choose the first case to demonstrate this forgery attack. As discussed in Sect. 
3.1.3, the complete attack would be performed as follows: 
1. Create a generator to produce 642  random four-block plaintexts of the form
1 4,...,P P , each block with the length of 128 bits.  
2. Set two distinct fixed plaintext blocks: '1P and
'
2P , and let
*
,1 ,1n nP P ,
*
,2 ,2n nP P ,
* '
,3 1nP P  , 
* '
,4 2nP P , 
*
,5 ,3n nP P and
*
,6 ,4n nP P .  
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3. Encrypt these plaintext messages with EPBC to yield corresponding ciphertext 
messages * *
,1 ,6,...,n nC C respectively.  
4. Find out ciphertext messages with * *
,4 ,4n mC C  in the 
642  ciphertexts.  
5. Construct a forged message *C = * * * *,1 ,2 ,3 ,6, , ,...,n n m mC C C C . 
6. Decrypt the forged message with EPBC checking whether * *
,6 ,6n mP P . 
However, the amount of calculation involved in both approaches is computational 
intensive. Instead, we manually construct two messages P  and 'P  with '1 1i jP P  ,
'
i jP P and 
'
i jC C to verify the feasibility of the forgery attack. More specifically:  
1. We compiled two plaintext messages with five 128-bit message blocks, as 
shown in Table 3.41. Note that the first block of Plaintext 2 is the same as the 
second block of Plaintext 1. 
2. Using M-PCBC mode with 128-bit AES as the underlying block cipher, we ran 
the M-PCBC algorithm to encrypt these plaintexts and obtained the 
ciphertexts as shown in Table 3.42.  
3. We constructed a forged message as described above. The fraudulent 
message is shown in Table 3.43 (replace the first ciphertext blocks of 
ciphertext 2 with the first two ciphertext blocks of ciphertext 1).   
4. We obtain a new message with the same last message block as the original 
plaintext 2 when we decrypt the forged message, as shown in Table 3.44.  
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Plaintext 1: 
43c3033ca7bf6f0a851ed410baa82273 
58ced1d522fb163cb319dd839977184b 
234da902a9c1cb1c43a04555c2d1fce9 
e36f8cb9397324e3e7ed02618fb2fcc1 
3cd7f79537705b964ef9c53e728fbd88 
 
plaintext 2: 
58ced1d522fb163cb319dd839977184b 
b73b79d3e724bb54ee5c4beffb2ac29a 
d99ba541c3d676889917605de6cfaee5 
b8e43e1d56033ac97b22c324575ae416 
e66f4f26d1ac03fdb4e8e4c300c3cbb1 
Table 3.41 Experimental plaintext messages for chosen-plaintext attack (M-PCBC) 
Ciphertext 1: 
64d859d69ca675dcb65542cc1671c12d 
deb3c1b4cc2ae9e8809f2c3d918f4955 
bdfde5cd6e2e1d0c5dec5ca242214658 
c4f02ddebda262d8e076748d8234f924 
0549b50108bd030b0afaa7a6ef808b28 
 
Ciphertext 2: 
deb3c1b4cc2ae9e8809f2c3d918f4955 
7d7f9931fd67685cf9c7d5f0ff9f7ad2 
304a2e33d5aa6fae6ef2bba98af00bb3 
5f0b0694909063e10a323a911c755881 
8ccd2b7640172390104defb5020614ee 
Table 3.42 Experimental ciphertext messages for chosen-plaintext attack (M-PCBC) 
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64d859d69ca675dcb65542cc1671c12d 
deb3c1b4cc2ae9e8809f2c3d918f4955 
7d7f9931fd67685cf9c7d5f0ff9f7ad2 
304a2e33d5aa6fae6ef2bba98af00bb3 
5f0b0694909063e10a323a911c755881 
8ccd2b7640172390104defb5020614ee 
Table 3.43 The forged message for chosen-plaintext attack (M-PCBC) 
43c3033ca7bf6f0a851ed410baa82273 
58ced1d522fb163cb319dd839977184b 
b73b79d3e724bb54ee5c4beffb2ac29a 
d99ba541c3d676889917605de6cfaee5 
b8e43e1d56033ac97b22c324575ae416 
e66f4f26d1ac03fdb4e8e4c300c3cbb1 
Table 3.44 Decrypted forged ciphertext for chosen-plaintext attack (M-PCBC) 
3.4.2.5 Comparison 
Suppose the block length of the underlying cipher is 128 bits and that this cipher 
uses a 128-bit key. Also, suppose the attacker knows a number of consecutive pairs 
of plaintext and ciphertext blocks. Table 3.45 (following) compares the results of the 
different attack approaches that we have considered. Note that Those attacks which 
did not give complexity figures in brackets can be perform straight away with certain 
success probabilities rather than going through comparisons to obtain certain 
conditional parameters first then computing success probabilities. 
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Forgery attack 
types 
Success rate 
(complexity) 
Assumption Comments 
Exhaustive key 
search  
( 1282 ) The first three block 
pairs are available 
A forgery attack is guaranteed once
K is identified. 
Brute force ICV 2 l  The last l bits of 
plaintext is ICV 
If 128l  bits, then this approach has 
lower complexity than other attacks. 
Otherwise this approach has the 
same performance, or has lower 
success probability. 
Ciphertext block 
reordering 
1 None This forgery is guaranteed. 
Ciphertext block 
deletion 
1 The first three block 
pairs are available 
This forgery is guaranteed. 
Chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack 1 
1 
( 1272 ) 
'
1 1i jP P  ,
'
i jP P in 
two distinct messages  
Regardless of the length of message 
and the feature of the function g . 
Chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack 2 
642   
( 1272 ) 
a single  plaintext 
block in two distinct 
messages are 
matching 
Regardless of the length of message 
and the feature of the function g . 
Table 3.45 The comparison of different attacks for M-PCBC 
Note that Mitchell’s attack and our deletion attack are both easily to apply and give a 
guranteed forgery.  The exhaustive key search and  chosen-plaintext forgery both 
give a guaranteed forgery, but the calculation complexity is prohibitive. Brute force 
ICV needs the attacker to choose ciphertext randomly and hope that the correct ICV 
is returned by the decryption operation. So in this case when we generate a forgery, 
we do not know whether it is successful until the receiver accepts it.  
3.4.3 Summary 
M-PCBC is intended as an improvement of PCBC. However, it is still extremely 
vulnerable to ciphertext only forgery attack. Ciphertext blocks can be swapped in an 
even (or an odd) position without affecting the value of the decryption of the final 
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block. This demonstrates that M-PCBC is also vulnerable to forgeries. We also 
demonstrate a known-plaintext forgery attack, which allows the attacker to delete 
some blocks and still keep the unrecovered final block unchanged.  
We investigated exhaustive key search on M-PCBC and use the complexity of this for 
comparisons. Brute force ofK guarantees a forgery attack with complexity 1282 . The 
chosen-plaintext forgery attack, which works for EPBC and IOBC, also can be applied 
to M-PCBC with a complexity of 1272 . None of these attacks are useful or practical. 
Then, we investigated brute force of ICV. In comparison to other attacks, it just 
needs to alter the ciphertext and hope that the last ciphertext block can decrypt to 
the correct ICV. This will occur with the probability of 2 l where l  is the length of ICV.  
All of this evidence shows that message integrity assurance provided by M-PCBC can 
be easily broken.   
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigated the integrity protection provided by EPBC, IOBC and 
M-PCBC.  
Mitchell outlined a chosen-plaintext forgery attack in his cryptanalysis of IOBC. We 
showed that this approach can actually be applied to EPBC and M-PCBC as well and 
quantified Mitchell’s claim in our Theorem 3.3. Mitchell’s attack requires finding two 
consecutive common blocks in two messages. We proposed that this attack can be 
performed by finding one common block instead but with similar complexity. The 
difference between our proposal and Mitchell’s approach is that with the same 
number of known messages to perform the forgery attack, on average our proposal 
can find two required collisions but only one of them can give us a successful forgery, 
whereas Mitchell’s approach can find one required collision which gives us an almost 
guaranteed forgery. 
We showed that Mitchell’s forgery attack on EPBC is only a probabilistic attack rather 
than a guaranteed successful forgery. His forgery attack requires the knowledge of 
the inner vectors iG . As discussed in Sect. 3.2.1, this inner vector can only be 
narrowed to two alternatives per bit pair rather than one as was claimed in 
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Mitchell’s paper. We further proposed an alternative approach to apply the forgery 
attack by inserting a single ciphertext block; this attack has the same probability of 
success as Mitchell’s attack. Multiple ciphertext blocks also can be inserted, but the 
more blocks inserted; the lower the success probability of the attack. We 
investigated exhaustive key search for the two keys in EPBC. The results show that 
these attacks are not useful or practical. The chosen-plaintext forgery attack on EPBC 
is also impractical. The success rate of brute force ICV depends on the length of the 
ICV. We recommended ICV length is at least 128-bit to provide better security. On 
the basis of the complexity of all attacks we investigated, EPBC is resistant against 
forgery attack.  
For IOBC, Mitchell found out that the length of one of the sub-rotations that are 
rotated by the function g is a multiple of 3. Using this feature, an attacker can 
introduce a known-plaintext forgery attack with the success rate of /32 n . Mitchell’s 
probabilistic attack allows some consecutive blocks to be deleted from the 
ciphertext without affecting the ICV. We proposed an alternative approach to apply 
the forgery attack by inserting some consecutive ciphertext blocks, which has the 
same probability of success as Mitchell’s attack. The exhaustive key search, brute 
force ICV and the chosen-plaintext forgery attack we investigated on IOBC are less 
effective compared to Mitchell’s deletion attack. Our experimental verification 
supports Mitchell’s suggestion that IOBC fails to guarantee the assurance of integrity 
services to messages.  
The properties of M-PCBC make it extremely vulnerable to ciphertext only forgery 
attack. Ciphertext blocks can be swapped in an even (or an odd) position without 
affecting the value of the decryption of the final block to generate the correct 
plaintext. We demonstrated that M-PCBC is also vulnerable to known-plaintext 
forgery attack. This vulnerability allows the attacker to delete some blocks and still 
keep the unrecovered final block unchanged. Exhaustive key search, brute force ICV 
and chosen-plaintext forgery attack on M-PCBC are less effective than the reordering 
attack. All of these evidences show that message integrity assurance provided by M-
PCBC can be easily broken.   
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4. Recent one-pass proposals 
A recent contest, CAESAR (Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, 
Applicability, and Robustness), called for submissions of proposals for AE schemes 
[30]. Several submissions are based on AES, of which two use block chaining, namely 
AES-JAMBU [9] and AES-COPA [31]. Both these schemes use AES-128 as the 
underlying block cipher. Note that although AES-JAMBU and AES-COPA are chaining 
AE schemes, they do not use a predefined value (ICV) to provide integrity protection. 
Instead, they both use MACs for integrity assurance. In each case, a MAC tag is 
generated using an extra block encryption operation. We describe AES-JAMBU and 
discuss the application of forgery attacks similar to those in Chapter 3 to it. AES-
COPA will be left for future work.   
4.1 AES-JAMBU description 
AES-JAMBU [9] is designed to be a lightweight AE encryption mode. It uses a 64-bit 
IV, a 64-bit associated data (used for routing purposes) and a 128-bit secret key. The 
plaintext is padded as follows: a ‘1’ bit is padded on the end of the plaintext P , 
followed by padding with ‘0’s until the length of plaintext is a multiple of 64 bits. The 
message is then divided into 64-bit blocks. Confidentiality is provided by XORing 
plaintext blocks iP with pseudo random 64-bit values 1iV   generated by the 
algorithm to produce ciphertext blocks iC . Integrity is provided by a MAC tag T  
generated in the final encryption block. Both the ciphertext and the MAC tag are 
sent to the receiver. AES-JAMBU has five inner vectors, namely , , ,i i i iR U V X and iY ; 
for convenience, we also use iS  to denote the concatenation of iU and iV . These 
inner vectors are chaining blocks together.  
4.1.1 Encryption 
The plaintext is divided into 64-bit blocks, iP . Each plaintext block iP  is encrypted to 
a corresponding ciphertext block iC . The encryption operation is shown in Fig. 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 AES-JAMBU encryption 
The AES-JAMBU encryption operation is defined as follows : 
1 1i i iU X P   ,1 1i u   , 
1 1i i iV Y R   ,1 1i u   , 
1i i iR R U  ,1 1i u   , 
1i i iC P V   ,1 1i u   , 
( ) ( )i i K i iX Y e U V , 1 1i u   , 
1 1 1u u uT R X Y     . 
where 640 0( ) (0 )KX Y e IV , 0 0R X and 0P A . Note that all parameters in AES-
JAMBU encryption algorithm are 64-bit blocks. The 64-bit inner vector 1iV  is used for 
encryption. The last block of output of the encryption generates a 64-bit tag, T , 
used to provide integrity assurance for the scheme. Refer to [9] for the specific 
description. 
4.1.2 Decryption 
The decryption process is similar to the encryption and is performed as follows:  
1 1i i iV Y R   ,1 1i u   , 
1i i iP C V   ,1 1i u   , 
1 1i i iU X P   ,1 1i u   , 
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1i i iR R U  ,1 1i u   , 
( ) ( )i i K i iX Y e U V , 1 1i u   , 
1 1 1' u u uT R X Y     , 
with the same initial conditions for 
0X , 0Y , 0R and 0P . As indicated, the plaintext is 
computed by XORing the ciphertext blocks with the inner vector 
1iV  .  
4.1.3 MAC verification 
In terms of verification, the receiver decrypts the ciphertext message block by block 
in the same order of encryption operation. When the last ciphertext block is 
decrypted, the receiver can calculate a MAC tag 'T  and compare it to the MAC tag 
T that was given by the sender. If 'T does not match T , the message is rejected by 
the receiver. 
4.2 Forgery attacks 
In general, there are three approaches for trying to breach data integrity: data 
insertion, data deletion and data modification. For a successful forgery attack, the 
modified ciphertext must pass the integrity check. In other words, the attacker has 
to ensure that the transmitted MAC tag is consistent with the recovered plaintext. In 
AES-JAMBU, the MAC tag 1 1 1u u uT R X Y     . If the attacker can keep those inner 
vectors that contribute to the tag T unchanged in the forged ciphertext, the forged 
ciphertext can pass the integrity check of AES-JAMBU. This is a similar approach to 
the one discussed in Chapter 3. We consider the application of attacks discussed in 
Sect. 3 to AES-JAMBU below. 
4.2.1 Exhaustive key search 
AES-JAMBU uses a 128-bit keyK to encrypt i i iS U V to obtain two inner vectors 
iX and iY . An attacker who only knows the ciphertext can guess the secret key and 
decrypt the ciphertext to see whether it gives recognizable plaintext. If some 
plaintext blocks are known to the attacker, they can guess the secret key and decrypt 
the ciphertext and check whether those recovered plaintext blocks are correct. Both 
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cases require 1282 guesses. Checking each of these guesses will require at least one 
decryption, so the complexity of this attack is 1282 . 
4.2.2 Brute force of MAC 
To brute force the MAC, the attacker randomly chooses a value for the tag for the 
forged ciphertext and hopes that the receiver accepts the message as genuine. This 
approach has a success probability of 642  of finding the correct tag. 
4.2.3 Altered Ciphertext 
In AES-JAMBU, the five inner vectors , , ,i i i iR U V X and iY  are related (a change to any 
one will result in changes to others).  Suppose ciphertext blocks 
1 2, ,..., uC C C  are 
AES-JAMBU encrypted version of plaintext blocks 1 2, ,..., uP P P . 
1. Data insertion- Assume the attacker knows a number of plaintext/ciphertext 
blocks. Given that 1i i iP C V    and those known plaintext/ciphertext blocks
( , )i iP C , the corresponding values of 1iV  are known. Suppose that attacker 
constructs a forged ciphertext message * * *1 2 1, ,..., uC C C  , where
* * *
1 2 1 2, ,..., , ,...,i iC C C C C C , 
* *
2 1 1,..., ,...,i u i uC C C C   , and 
*
1 1 2i i iC P V    . 
We have  
* *
1 1 2i i iP C V     
                     1 2 2i i iP V V      
                                                                                1iP . 
The plaintext block 1iP remains unchanged, so that 2iR  , 2iX  and 2iY  will 
remain unchanged. However, the following plaintext blocks will be altered 
after the decryption operation. More specifically, we have *2 1 3i i iP C V    . 
However the original 2 2 3i i iP C V    . Since 3 2 2i i iV Y R    remains 
unchanged, there is a 642 chance that 1 2i iC C  , resulting in 
*
2 2i iP P  . The 
value of * 2iP then will affect 
* *
3 2 2i i iU P X    . Since 3 2 2i i iU P X    , 
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similarly, there is a 642 chance  that *3 3i iU U  . Afterwards, 
* *
3 3 3( , )i i iS U V  
will be affected. Since
3 3 3( , )i i iS U V   , again similarly, there is a
642 chance 
that *
3 3i iS S  . When
*
3iS  gets decrypted, 
* * *
3 3 3( ) ( , )K i i id S X Y   , similar to 
the above, we have a very low chance to obtain *
3 3i iX X   and
*
3 3i iY Y  . 
Since * *
3 2 3i i iR R U    , 
*
3iR  also has a very low chance to be equal with 3iR  .  
The above shows that all following plaintext blocks and inner vectors starting 
from the inserted block will almost certainly be changed when they get 
decrypted. Note that the values of * 3iX  ,
*
3iY  and
*
3iR   are not only changed, 
but also unknown. Recall that 
1 1 1u u uT R X Y     . So the attacker has no 
control over the change of the message. In other words, the attacker does 
not know how the change will affect the tag T . In such a case, the attacker 
can only insert a ciphertext block and hope the receiver will recompute a tag 
'T  that matches with the legitimate tag T . The tag T  in AES-JAMBU is 64 
bits. Thus, the probability that the attacker can successfully insert a 
ciphertext block is 642 .  
2. Data deletion- Similar to insertion, when the attacker deletes a ciphertext 
block, the subsequent inner vectors will be altered straight away. For 
example, if iC is deleted by the attacker, then
*
1 1i i iP C V   . Since
1i i iP C V   , there is then a 
642 chance that *i iP P . Note that the same 
probability will apply in the following argument.  The value of *iP  will almost 
certainly change the values of * *1i i iU P X   ( 1i i iU P X   ). Then 
*
1iU  will 
almost certainly alter * *1 1i i iR R U   ( 1 1i i iR R U   ) and 
* *
1 1 1( , )i i iS U V  
( 1 1 1( , )i i iS U V   ). Finally, 
*
1iS   will almost certainly change the value of 
*
1iX 
and *1iY  . The attacker does not know what the changes are. Recall that 
1 1 1u u uT R X Y     . So the receiver will calculate a false MAC tag for the 
verification.  In such a case, the attacker can only delete ciphertext blocks 
and hope the receiver will recompute a tag 'T  that matches with the 
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legitimate tag T . The tag T  in AES-JAMBU is 64 bits. Thus, the probability 
that the attacker can successfully insert ciphertext blocks is 642 . 
3. Data modification- Similar to deletion, any modifications in the ciphertext 
blocks will change the corresponding recovered plaintext blocks and all 
following inner vectors. Since the attacker does not know how the change 
will affect the tag T , they can only modify ciphertext blocks and hope the 
forged ciphertext will pass the integrity check. The tag T  in AES-JAMBU is 64 
bits. Thus, the probability that the attacker can successfully insert a 
ciphertext block is 642 . 
4.2.4 Chosen-plaintext attack 
In this section, we consider whether the chosen-plaintext forgery attack that was 
applied to the ciphers in Chapter 3 can be applied to AES-JAMBU. To apply this 
attack, the attacker needs to find a pair of messages where the inner vectors at one 
stage are the same. Then a forgery can be constructed as discussed in Sect. 3.1. We 
quantify the probability of having the inner vector of AES-JAMBU equal in the 
following theorem. 
Theorem 4.1: Assume for AES-JAMBU that we have two plaintextsP and 'P , such 
that 'i jP P . If
'
i jC C for the corresponding ciphertexts, then
' ',( i j i jPr X X Y Y  and
' 128) 2i jR R
 ; that is ' ' ' ', ,( |i j i j i j i jX X Y Y R R Cr CP    
128) 2 . 
Proof: 
 
Choose any value for ' ' '{ , , }j j jX Y R  at random; then
' ' '
1j j jV Y R   is also known. 
Suppose now that 'i jC C ; since also
'
i jP P , then
'
1 1i jV V  . There are
642
combinations of iY and iR such that
'
1 1i i i jV Y R V    . There are also
642 possible 
values for iX , independently of the validity of this equation. Hence, there are
1282
values of{ , , }i i iX Y R for which
'
i jC C , of which only one has
' ' '{ , , } { , , }i i i j j jX Y R X Y R . 
Assuming that all values of { , , }i i iX Y R are equally likely, the claimed result follows 
directly.  
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Assume the two plaintext messages P and 'P  are constructed with '
i jP P .  If the 
messages are otherwise unrelated, it is easy to show that the probability that 
'
i jC C  is 
642 . By the birthday paradox, we need about 322 messages to find a pair 
of message with '
i jC C , so that we can perform the forgery attack. Then, we need 
to run roughly 632 comparisons to check every pair of messages to find the collision. 
Therefore, the complexity of the chosen-plaintext attack is 632 . However, Theorem 
4.1 shows that the success probability of this attack is very low ( 1282 ). 
 
Theorem 4.2: Suppose that we have two plaintexts with '
i jP P and
'
1 1i jP P  . If 
'
i jC C  and
'
1 1i jC C  for the corresponding ciphertexts, then
' ',( i j i jPr X X Y Y  and
' 64) 2i jR R
 ; that is ' ' ' ', ,( |i j i j i j i jX X Y Y R R Cr CP     and
'
1 1
64) 2i jC C 
 . 
 
Proof: 
Choose any value for ' ' '{ , , }j j jX Y R  at random; then
' ' '
1j j jV Y R   is also known. 
Suppose again that 'i jC C and choose any value for iX ; then
'
1 1i jV V  as before and
1i i iU X P   is determined, so 1 1 1 1( , ) ( , )i i K i iX Y e U V    is also determined. If we 
also require that '
1 1i jC C  , then
'
2 2i jV V  ; further, for any given value of
'
2jV  , 
1 2 1i i iR V Y    is then determined, from which it follows that 1 1i i iR U R   and
1i i iY R V   are also determined. Thus, for any value of
'
2jV  , each value of iX  
corresponds to exactly one solution{ , , }i i iX Y R . It follow that there are exactly
642
values of{ , , }i i iX Y R for which
'
i jC C  and
'
1 1i jC C  , of which only one has
'
i jX X , 
and the claimed result again follows directly.  
Assume the messages are constructed with '
i jP P and
'
1 1i jP P  .  Then, the 
probability that '
i jC C and
'
1 1i jC C   is 
1282 . By the birthday paradox, we need 
about 642 messages to find a pair of message with 'i jC C and
'
1 1i jC C  , so that we 
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can perform the forgery attack. Then, we need to run roughly 1272 comparisons to 
check every pair of messages to find the collision. Therefore, the complexity of the 
chosen-plaintext attack is 1272 . However, Theorem 4.2 shows that the success 
probability of this attack is very low ( 642 ), which is no better than brute force on the 
tag. 
 
It is obvious that the success probability after finding two consecutive ciphertext 
blocks in common is considerably higher than that after finding a single common 
ciphertext block. For both cases, however, the success rate of the attack is still 
impractically low even when the ciphertext condition is met. 
4.2.5 Comparison 
The block length of the underlying cipher AES is 128 bits and this cipher uses a 128-
bit key. Suppose the attacker knows a number of consecutive pairs of plaintext and 
ciphertext blocks. Table 4.1 (following) compares the results of the different attack 
approaches that we have considered. Note that Those attacks which did not give 
complexity figures in brackets can be perform straight away with certain success 
probabilities rather than going through comparisons to obtain certain conditional 
parameters first then computing success probabilities. 
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Forgery attack 
types 
Success rate 
(complexity) 
Assumption Comments 
Exhaustive key 
search  
( 1282 ) Some block pairs are 
available 
A forgery attack is guaranteed once
K is identified. 
Brute force MAC 642  None The short tag length weakens the 
integrity assurance of this cipher. 
Ciphertext block 
insertion 
642  One plaintext block iP  
and the associated 
inner vector 
1iV   are 
known 
The attacker has no control over the 
change of ciphertext. 
Ciphertext block 
deletion 
642  None The attacker has no control over the 
change of ciphertext. 
Ciphertext block 
modification 
642  None The attacker has no control over the 
change of ciphertext. 
Chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack 1 
642   
( 1272 ) 
Two consecutive 
plaintext blocks in 
common in two 
distinct messages  
The success rate is too low to be 
practical.  
Chosen-plaintext 
forgery attack 2 
1272   
( 632 ) 
One plaintext block in 
common in two 
distinct messages 
The success rate is too low to be 
practical. 
Table 4.1 The comparison of different attacks for AES-JAMBU 
Note that the exhaustive key search and chosen-plaintext forgery both have 
prohibitive complexities. The former one gives a guaranteed forgery, but the latter 
does not. Altering ciphertext (by insertion, deletion or modification) and brute force 
on the MAC have the same success rate. The attacker does not know how the 
change will affect the tag by altering ciphertext. In such a case, the attacker can only 
change a ciphertext and hope the receiver will calculate a correct MAC tag.  
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4.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we investigated a recently proposed one-pass AE scheme, AES-
JAMBU, which also uses block chaining similar to IOBC, EPBC and M-PCBC discussed 
in Chapter 3. However, there is also a big structural difference between AES-JAMBU 
and the other three schemes. Take the most secure one among the three schemes, 
EPBC, for example. It uses an ICV to protect data integrity rather than a MAC. EPBC 
has two inner vectors 
iF  and iG , which are directly related ( ( )i K iF e G ). This 
feature allows the attacker to tamper with the ciphertext (by deleting or inserting 
ciphertext blocks) and conduct chosen-plaintext attack. AES-JAMBU has five inner 
vectors. None of these alone can determine the value of the rest.   
If attackers want to run a successful forgery on AES-JAMBU, they have to keep the 
inner vectors that contribute to the tag unchanged in the forged ciphertext. This case 
is similar to IOBC, EPBC and M-PCBC, which require that inner vectors can be 
adjusted before the decryption of the final ciphertext block, so that the ICV will 
remain unchanged. Therefore, we applied same attack approaches discussed in 
Chapter 3 on AES-JAMBU to investigate its integrity assurance. We found that 
exhaustive key search and the chosen-plaintext forgery attack on AES-JAMBU both 
have prohibitive complexities. Since AES-JAMBU uses a 64-bit tag, brute force on the 
MAC can be performed with a success probability of 642 . Ciphertext insertion, 
deletion and modification have the same success rate as brute force of the MAC. The 
attacker does not know how the change will affect the tag in those attacks.  
From our observation AES-JAMBU is secure in practice, as the attack is no better 
than guessing the tag. The design is secure since the best attack is brute force, but 
that the 64-bit level security provided is much less than that provided in other 
schemes with a 128-bit tag. 
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5. Conclusion  
Authenticated encryption mechanisms are important for protecting messages sent 
over insecure networks. AE can provide security assurance to messages, ensuring 
that only legitimate messages are accepted and the confidentiality of messages is 
protected over transmission. In order to provide sufficient protection to network 
communication, it is critical to apply AE mechanisms. In the open literature, only 
limited investigation into the security of proposed AE modes based on block ciphers 
has been conducted. Hence, this research is important to the existing AE modes 
based on block ciphers. In addition, the outcome of security analysis over new 
designs produced may provide significant social and economic benefits if they are 
applied to protect network communication. 
Some attacks have successfully broken the integrity component of some AE schemes. 
Also, there is a call for new AE schemes, namely CAESAR competition, including block 
cipher based schemes. More security analysis of AE proposals needs to be conducted 
prior to their adoption in a cryptographic standard. This research contributes to this 
effort by analysing the integrity of four recently proposed AE schemes which are 
based on chaining block cipher modes, namely EPBC, IOBC, M-PCBC and AES-JAMBU.  
Beside the block chaining feature, EPBC, IOBC, M-PCBC and AES-JAMBU are all one-
pass AE schemes-processing the data once with one algorithm to provide AE. EPBC, 
IOBC and M-PCBC use an ICV to provide integrity assurance. AES-JAMBU uses the 
MAC approach rather than the ICV approach to provide integrity assurance. However, 
when an error happens in these four ciphers, the block chaining feature allows them 
to propagate the error to following blocks, resulting in the decryption of the ICV 
being affected or the calculation of the MAC being incorrect, so that the modified 
ciphertext cannot pass the integrity check. Because of this similarity, we applied 
similar forgery attack approaches to EPBC, IOBC, M-PCBC and AES-JAMBU. These 
include a chosen-plaintext attack and forgeries such as insertion, deletion, 
reordering and concatenation of ciphertext blocks.  We compared these attacks 
against standard reference attacks such as brute force key search, brute force attack 
on the ICV or the MAC.  
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In this thesis, we generally assume that AES is the underlying block cipher and all 
ciphers use a 128-bit key. We introduced experiments to verify the validity of all 
forgery attacks against the integrity of EPBC, IOBC, M-PCBC. 
Mitchell outlined a chosen-plaintext forgery attack in his cryptanalysis of IOBC. We 
showed that this approach also can be applied to EPBC, M-PCBC and AES-JAMBU, 
and explained this approach in detail for each cipher. Mitchell’s attack requires a 
large number of messages, each of which has two consecutive plaintext blocks in 
common. Mitchell did not calculate the success probability of the attack but 
conjectured that the probability in the case of IOBC is very high. We determined 
these probabilities and confirmed this conjecture for IOBC, EPBC and M-PCBC. We 
also determined the calculation complexity associated with this attack in each case. 
More specifically, for IOBC, the complexity of finding that the ciphertext blocks 
corresponding to the common plaintext blocks in two messages are the same is 1272 ; 
and there is a 1281 2 chance to run a successful forgery when the ciphertext 
condition is met. For EPBC, the complexity of finding required ciphertext condition is 
again 1272 ; and the probability of running a successful forgery is slightly higher than
1281 2  when the ciphertext condition is met. For M-PCBC, the complexity to find a 
common ciphertext blocks in two messages (when the messages have two 
consecutive plaintext blocks in common) is 1272 ; and a forgery is guaranteed when 
the ciphertext condition is met. However, for AES-JAMBU, while the complexity of 
finding required ciphertext blocks is 1272  , there is only a 642 chance to run a 
successful forgery when the ciphertext condition is met. 
We also proposed an attack, similar to Mitchell’s chosen-plaintext forgery attack, on 
IOBC, EPBC, M-PCBC and AES-JAMBU, where we consider messages with a single 
plaintext block in common and look for messages where the corresponding 
ciphertext blocks are equal. For IOBC, EPBC and AES-JAMBU, this attack has similar 
complexity to Mitchell’s proposal of performing a successful forgery. The probability 
of a successful forgery attack on M-PCBC is significantly reduced to 642 . 
We reviewed Mitchell’s deletion attack on EPBC and showed that it cannot give a 
guaranteed forgery. For the case where the block length of the underlying cipher is 
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128 bits, the success rate of Mitchell’s forgery attack is 1282 . We proposed an 
insertion attack which has the same success rate as Mitchell’s attack. The success 
probabilities of the other attacks (exhaustive key search and chosen plaintext attack) 
we investigated are no better than guessing the ICV. EPBC demonstrates high 
strength against forgery attack to protect data integrity. 
In terms of IOBC, we implemented Mitchell’s analysis. For a case where the block 
length of the underlying cipher is 64 bits (128 bits), the success rate of Mitchell’s 
forgery attack, deleting 682 (2730) consecutive blocks, is 222 ( 422 ), confirming 
Mitchell’s result. We further proposed an alternative approach to apply the forgery 
attack by inserting 682 consecutive ciphertext blocks. This attack has the same 
probability of success as Mitchell’s attack, namely 222 ( 422 ). Exhaustive key search, 
chosen plaintext attack and brute force ICV on IOBC are less efficient than the 
deletion and insertion attack. Our experimental verification supports Mitchell’s 
suggestion that IOBC fails to guarantee the assurance of integrity services to 
messages. 
The M-PCBC cipher is extremely vulnerable to ciphertext only attack. Ciphertext 
blocks can be swapped in an even (or an odd) position without affecting the value of 
the decryption of the final block to generate the correct plaintext. Furthermore, we 
demonstrated that M-PCBC is also vulnerable to known-plaintext forgery attack. This 
vulnerability allows the attacker to delete some blocks and leave the final block 
unchanged. All of these evidences show that the integrity of M-PCBC can be easily 
broken.  
AES-JAMBU is a recently proposed one-pass scheme for CAESAR competition. It uses 
the MAC approach rather than the ICV approach to provide integrity assurance 
unlike EPBC, IOBC and M-PCBC. We applied similar attack approaches to those, 
which were introduced on EPBC, IOBC and M-PCBC, to AES-JAMBU. The results show 
that none of those attacks can work better than brute force on the MAC. However, 
this was only an initial analysis and further investigation will be required to 
determine whether there are other weaknesses in this algorithm. 
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It is also worth noting that for real-world application, AE schemes must operate 
efficiently in their implementations in hardware or software. Considering the time 
span of this research, we only focused on the security analysis of EPBC, IOBC, M-
PCBC and AES-JAMBU modes, but did not investigate the efficiency of these ciphers. 
Furthermore, the other one-pass submissions for CAESAR competition need to be 
investigated, i.e. AES-COPA, before their adoption in a cryptographic standard. The 
submissions also include two-pass schemes and schemes which do not use AES as 
the underlying block cipher. They need to be thoroughly examined as well. For 
cipher designers, they need to find the solution to provide better protection to 
conceal inner vectors, if they use chaining feature for block cipher based AE schemes. 
Introducing more inner vectors, as in AES-JAMBU may be a useful approach. These 
are future areas of investigation. 
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